Pragmatic Policy vs Ideological Philosophy
For some time now, Democrats and Republicans alike have been yearning for a great philosophical clash between the two parties. No more of this five percent of 12 percent of the federal budget stuff. We wanted entitlements, the role of government, the obligations that the old have to the young, that the rich have to the poor, that the powerful have to the powerless.
Paul Ryan’s budget offer exactly that sort of reconstruction of the social compact. America is a very different place before his budget than it would be after his budget. But though Obama’s speech was closer to that sort of clash of visions than anything he’s offered before — he used the word “vision” 15 times, for instance — what he offered was not philosophy. It was policy. But you have to read it closely — and know where it came from — to see that.
This is difficult advice when it comes to deficit reduction, but don’t look at the number. This plan cuts $4 trillion, that plan cuts $2 trillion, that one cuts $10 trillion. Those numbers reflect little but the internal hopes and dreams of the plan. If I say that my plan means Medicare will never spend another penny and economic growth will shoot to 8 percent — and that’s only a shade less optimistic than the assumptions and models included in the Ryan budget (pdf) — I can save an almost unlimited amount of money. My number can be anything I want it to be. The problem is I actually can’t save that much money because my math is based on fantasy. So my number is meaningless.
President Obama says his plan cuts $4 trillion over 12 years. Rep. Paul Ryan says his plan cuts $4 trillion over 10 years. If you look at the numbers, the two plans appear quite similar. But if you look at how they’d get to the number, they couldn’t be more different. And it’s how you get to the number that matters, because that’s what decides whether you’ll get to the number. It’s also, incidentally, what decides the shape of our government going forward.
Ryan’s number is the product of holding the growth of Medicare and Medicaid to the rate of inflation, which is far lower than has ever been shown to be possible. How he gets there is, on Medicaid, he tells the states to figure it out, and on Medicare, he tells seniors to figure it out. Both strategies have been tried: Various states have gotten waivers to radically remake their Medicaid program, and the consumer-driven model that Ryan is proposing for Medicare has been attempted in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program and Medicare Advantage. None of these programs have worked, which is why we’re in our current predicament.
Obama’s number is the product of holding Medicare growth to GDP+0.5 percent — which is, in practice, a few percentage points beyond inflation, and a few percentage points behind the health-care system’s normal rate of growth. He mostly gets there through the cost controls passed as part of the Affordable Care Act, which hope to hold Medicare to GDP+1 percent. He then proposes to shave a further half-percentage point off the growth rate by introducing value-based insurance — where we pay more for treatments that are proven to work than for treatments that are not proven to work — into Medicare and giving generic drugs quicker entry into the marketplace. These programs have worked at smaller scales and in more limited pilots. We don’t know if they’ll work across the entire Medicare system, but we have reason to think they will.
Then there are taxes. Ryan’s plan pledges to make the Bush tax cuts permanent, at a cost of at least $4 trillion over 10 years, and more after that. He’d then clean out the tax code, but he’d pump the money he made from closing expenditures back into tax cuts. Obama proposes to return to the Clinton-era tax rates on income over $250,000 and then raise a further trillion through closing tax expenditures. Altogether, that’s about $2 trillion less than letting all the Bush tax cuts expire, but at least $2 trillion more than Ryan’s plan. Notably, Obama hasn’t said which expenditures he’d close to get to $1 trillion. The difference between the two tax plans — particularly when added to Obama’s decision to cut $400 billion from security-related spending, while Ryan largely exempts that category — explains why Obama doesn’t have to make such deep cuts in programs for seniors and low-income Americans.
So are we finally getting the grand philosophical debate we wanted? Not quite. Obama spoke extensively of vision — the GOP’s, which “claims to reduce the deficit by spending a trillion dollars on tax cuts for millionaires and billionaires … {while} asking for sacrifice from those who can least afford it and don’t have any clout on Capitol Hill,” and his, “where we live within our means while still investing in our future; where everyone makes sacrifices but no one bears all the burden; where we provide a basic measure of security for our citizens and rising opportunity for our children,” but he’s overselling it.
Obama’s budget is not philosophy. It is very similar to the Simpson-Bowles report, which attracted the votes of Republicans as far to the right as Tom Coburn. Few Democrats would say their vision of balancing the budget is one in which there was only one dollar of new taxes for every three dollars of spending cuts, but that’s what Obama’s proposal envisions. Obama’s budget, somewhat curiously, is what you’d expect at the end of a negotiation process, not the beginning. In fact, as it’s modeled off of Simpson-Bowles, it is the product of a negotiation process, as opposed to an opening bid. It is, in other words, policy. You could argue that this is a philosophy, and that philosophy is pragmatism, but I think that’s getting too cute. This is the sort of policy that might pass and might work.
Ryan’s budget is purer, but it is also more fantastical. It posits the government it wishes were possible, and the policies it wishes would work. It is an opening bid so ideological that it leaves little room for a process of negotiation. Every dollar it purports to raise comes from cutting spending. Not one comes from taxes. It privatizes Medicare and unwinds the federal government’s role in Medicaid. For all the philosophy in his budget — and his budget does have a very different philosophy about the proper role of government than we see in federal pllicy today — there’s neither policy that could pass nor policy that could work. And, curiously for a conservative who distrusts both government and congress, it has no answer to the question of “what if this fails?”
The policy that clarifies this difference is the “trigger.” Obama’s budget, aware that it might not pass and, if it does pass, it might not work, proposes to make automatic cuts to discretionary spending and tax expenditures if the promised savings don’t materialize. If Ryan’s budget falls shorts, there’s no comparable failsafe. That is to say, Obama’s budget has two plausible ways to get to its number, while Ryan’s budget has none. You don’t need a PhD in philosophy to understand why that’s a problem.
By: Ezra Klein, The Washington Post, April 13, 2011
The Long Game In The Budget Battles: Advantage Obama
Late last year, when President Obama overhauled his economic team, some people complained that the departure of Larry Summers and Christina Romer left the White House short of first-rate economists. That may have been true, but what the White House lost in intellectual sparkle it more than made up for in Washington know-how. With Gene Sperling as head of the National Economic Council and Jack Lew as budget director, it boasts two veterans of the Clinton-era budget war—two men who know how to outmaneuver right-wing Republicans.
In the past few months, Sperling and Lew have been playing from the nineteen-nineties playbook. Initially, they produced a budget for 2012 that didn’t do very much at all about long-term deficits, and was instantly proclaimed dead on arrival. Budget hawks cried foul. But the White House was playing a long game, and its budget proposal was merely an opening gambit. Then came Congressman Paul Ryan with his radical “roadmap” to budget balance over the next ten years, which featured slashing reductions in domestic spending, more big tax cuts for the rich, and the conversion of Medicare to a voucher program. I irked some readers by saying that Ryan deserved credit for at least making a specific proposal, but I still believe liberals everywhere should be grateful. By spelling out what the Republicans would do to Medicare and Medicaid, he may well have deprived his party of the White House for the foreseeable future.
If you want to know why Ryan’s “budget-cutting” plan makes no financial sense, the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf spells it out very clearly in his latest column, which is based on an analysis by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office analysis. If you want to know why Ryan’s plan is political poison, look at Ezra Klein’s blog, where he cites a recent opinion poll showing that a plurality of Republicans—yes Republicans—think the best option for Medicare is to not cut it at all. To say the very least, Ryan presented President Obama with a big opportunity to occupy the center ground. And despite the jibes about him being a covert socialist, this is clearly the ground on which the President feels most comfortable.
And so to today’s budget speech, in which Obama presented his own eminently centrist plan to reduce the deficit without privatizing Medicare, without slashing domestic spending to the point where many government programs won’t be able to operate, and without introducing any big tax increases. I wouldn’t sweat the individual numbers that Obama presented, such as his claim that his proposals would cut the budget deficit by four trillion dollars over twelve years. Forecasting the budget deficit next year is a challenge. Forecasting the deficit three years out is extremely difficult. Ten-year budget projections are largely meaningless.
What is important is the big picture. Where Ryan proposes radical changes to taxes and spending that would alter the social contract between government and governed, President Obama is arguing that we can trim our way to fiscal sustainability. Some cuts here, some tax breaks eliminated there, and, lo and behold, the deficit will be down to two per cent of G.D.P.
To be fair, the President isn’t saying it will be easy. If by 2014 Congress can’t come up with enough cuts to stabilize the debt-to-G.D.P. ratio, he is calling for a “debt failsafe” trigger that would involve spending reductions in all programs except Social Security, Medicaid, and low-income programs. To slow the growth of entitlement spending, he is proposing to beef up the Independent Payment Advisory Board, which the health-care reform act created, and setting it at a target of keeping Medicare growth to the rate of G.D.P. growth plus half a per cent. Even the Pentagon, which has been largely exempted from budget pressures since 9/11, would have to find some (overly modest) cuts. But compared to what Ryan is proposing, these are all relatively minor changes.
Is the plan credible? Without seeing the details, it is hard to say. In the fact-sheet it circulated today, the White House avoided saying which tax loopholes it is in favor of eliminating—the mortgage interest deduction?—and it also failed to provide any projections about, say, the level of federal spending and debt as a percentage of G.D.P. in 2020. That vagueness was certainly deliberate. At this juncture, the White House still doesn’t want to reveal all of its hand. Rather than placating the budget hawks with a definitive and fully worked out set of proposals, the Administration is betting that the bond market will give it more time—time in which the American people can learn more about the specifics of Ryan’s proposals, and get even less enthusiastic about them.
This game still has a long way to run. But if I were a betting man, and occasionally I am, I would wager on Sperling and Lew coming out on top rather than the congressman from Wisconsin.
By: John Cassidy, The New Yorker, April 13, 2011
Ludicrous and Cruel: America Is Being Punked By GOP Voodoo Economics
Many commentators swooned earlier this week after House Republicans, led by the Budget Committee chairman, Paul Ryan, unveiled their budget proposals. They lavished praise on Mr. Ryan, asserting that his plan set a new standard of fiscal seriousness.
Well, they should have waited until people who know how to read budget numbers had a chance to study the proposal. For the G.O.P. plan turns out not to be serious at all. Instead, it’s simultaneously ridiculous and heartless.
How ridiculous is it? Let me count the ways — or rather a few of the ways, because there are more howlers in the plan than I can cover in one column.
First, Republicans have once again gone all in for voodoo economics — the claim, refuted by experience, that tax cuts pay for themselves.
Specifically, the Ryan proposal trumpets the results of an economic projection from the Heritage Foundation, which claims that the plan’s tax cuts would set off a gigantic boom. Indeed, the foundation initially predicted that the G.O.P. plan would bring the unemployment rate down to 2.8 percent — a number we haven’t achieved since the Korean War. After widespread jeering, the unemployment projection vanished from the Heritage Foundation’s Web site, but voodoo still permeates the rest of the analysis.
In particular, the original voodoo proposition — the claim that lower taxes mean higher revenue — is still very much there. The Heritage Foundation projection has large tax cuts actually increasing revenue by almost $600 billion over the next 10 years.
A more sober assessment from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office tells a different story. It finds that a large part of the supposed savings from spending cuts would go, not to reduce the deficit, but to pay for tax cuts. In fact, the budget office finds that over the next decade the plan would lead to bigger deficits and more debt than current law.
And about those spending cuts: leave health care on one side for a moment and focus on the rest of the proposal. It turns out that Mr. Ryan and his colleagues are assuming drastic cuts in nonhealth spending without explaining how that is supposed to happen.
How drastic? According to the budget office, which analyzed the plan using assumptions dictated by House Republicans, the proposal calls for spending on items other than Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid — but including defense — to fall from 12 percent of G.D.P. last year to 6 percent of G.D.P. in 2022, and just 3.5 percent of G.D.P. in the long run.
That last number is less than we currently spend on defense alone; it’s not much bigger than federal spending when Calvin Coolidge was president, and the United States, among other things, had only a tiny military establishment. How could such a drastic shrinking of government take place without crippling essential public functions? The plan doesn’t say.
And then there’s the much-ballyhooed proposal to abolish Medicare and replace it with vouchers that can be used to buy private health insurance.
The point here is that privatizing Medicare does nothing, in itself, to limit health-care costs. In fact, it almost surely raises them by adding a layer of middlemen. Yet the House plan assumes that we can cut health-care spending as a percentage of G.D.P. despite an aging population and rising health care costs.
The only way that can happen is if those vouchers are worth much less than the cost of health insurance. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that by 2030 the value of a voucher would cover only a third of the cost of a private insurance policy equivalent to Medicare as we know it. So the plan would deprive many and probably most seniors of adequate health care.
And that neither should nor will happen. Mr. Ryan and his colleagues can write down whatever numbers they like, but seniors vote. And when they find that their health-care vouchers are grossly inadequate, they’ll demand and get bigger vouchers — wiping out the plan’s supposed savings.
In short, this plan isn’t remotely serious; on the contrary, it’s ludicrous.
And it’s also cruel.
In the past, Mr. Ryan has talked a good game about taking care of those in need. But as the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities points out, of the $4 trillion in spending cuts he proposes over the next decade, two-thirds involve cutting programs that mainly serve low-income Americans. And by repealing last year’s health reform, without any replacement, the plan would also deprive an estimated 34 million nonelderly Americans of health insurance.
So the pundits who praised this proposal when it was released were punked. The G.O.P. budget plan isn’t a good-faith effort to put America’s fiscal house in order; it’s voodoo economics, with an extra dose of fantasy, and a large helping of mean-spiritedness.
By: Paul Krugman, Op-Ed Columnist, The New York Times, April 7, 2011
Congressional Budget Office Looks At “RyanCare” Rationing And It Ain’t Pretty
The Congressional Budget Office has released its preliminary analysis (PDF) of House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan’s budget, and I wouldn’t say it’s pretty. According to the CBO, Medicare beneficiaries will be left paying more for less. The CBO goes about this in a bit of a confusing way, setting a “benchmark” that corresponds to the cost of purchasing a private plan equivalent to Medicare, and then seeing how much more that plan would cost than Medicare under two different scenarios. Compared with either scenario, RyanCare costs a lot more than Medicare:
Under the proposal, most elderly people would pay more for their health care than they would pay under the current Medicare system. For a typical 65-year-old with average health spending enrolled in a plan with benefits similar to those currently provided by Medicare, the CBO estimated the beneficiary’s spending on premiums and out-of-pocket expenditures as a share of a benchmark: what total health-care spending would be if a private insurer covered the beneficiary. By 2030, the beneficiary’s spending would be 68 percent of that benchmark under the proposal, 25 percent under the extended-baseline scenario, and 30 percent under the alternative fiscal scenario.
If Medicare’s beneficiaries are getting less for more, Medicaid’s are simply getting less, period:
Federal payments for Medicaid under the proposal would be substantially smaller than currently projected amounts. States would have additional flexibility to design and manage their Medicaid programs, and they might achieve greater efficiencies in the delivery of care than under current law. Even with additional flexibility, however, the large projected reduction in payments would probably require states to decrease payments to Medicaid providers, reduce eligibility for Medicaid, provide less extensive coverage to beneficiaries, or pay more themselves than would be the case under current law.
As the CBO recognizes, a lot of what Ryan is doing isn’t saving money so much as shifting costs. Poor people and seniors don’t need less health care because Medicare and Medicaid are providing less health care. They just have to pay for more of it on their own. And as the CBO says, it’s hard to imagine Congress simply ignoring their pleas for help:
Under the proposal analyzed here, debt would eventually shrink relative to the size of the economy — but the gradually increasing number of Medicare beneficiaries participating in the new premium support program would bear a much larger share of their health care costs than they would under the current program; payments to physicians and other providers for services provided under the traditional Medicare program would be restrained (as under the two scenarios); states would have to pay substantially more for their Medicaid programs or tightly constrain spending for those programs; and spending for federal programs other than Social Security and the major health care programs would be reduced far below historical levels relative to GDP. It is unclear whether and how future lawmakers would address the pressures resulting from the long-term scenarios or the proposal analyzed here.
By: Ezra Klein, The Washington Post, April 5, 2011
In Search of Plan “C” for Health Care Reform?….Stick With Plan “A”
The Washington Post has an editorial this morning that doesn’t exactly oppose the President’s health reform proposals, but gives the President a rap on the knuckles for not being more aggressive controlling costs. They are particularly aggrieved that the President proposes to delay the implementation of the “Cadillac tax” on high-cost health plans to 2018.
“Count us among the worriers. The tax is key for two reasons. It would raise revenue needed to pay subsidies to the currently uninsured; Mr. Obama chose the politically easier option of extending the Medicare tax to unearned income of the wealthy, thus making it more difficult down the road to prevent Medicare from going bankrupt. And, by discouraging expensive plans, such a tax would be the single most effective tool to reduce the cost growth that threatens the nation’s well-being”.
This editorial is one of the more exasperating documents to appear during health reform.
I happen to favor the “Cadillac tax,” though I wish it were more explicitly limited to affluent taxpayers. This is a sensitive issue. Workers have made wage concessions to expand or to preserve generous health benefits that might be affected by the new policy. I see nothing inherently wrong with giving unions and firms more time to adjust collective bargaining agreements in light of new tax policies.
Especially perverse is the Post’s criticism of proposals to raise Medicare taxes on the wealthy. Viewed outside the context of health reform, this provision provides one needed corrective to the regressive tax cuts enacted during the Bush years. The idea that it is simple political expediency to raise taxes on capital income of the wealthy comes as a great surprise to anyone who has followed American tax policy over (say) the past 30 years. Three other issues are especially irksome in the Post’s editorial.
First, President Obama proposes many features designed to reduce the level and growth of medical spending. He has gotten little political credit for these complex and controversial measures, but they are there.
Insurance exchanges will reduce administrative and marketing costs in the markets for individual and small-group coverage. This idea enjoys wide Democratic and Republican support. The President would reduce significant overpayments to Medicare advantage plans. He supports bundled payment models and other innovations designed to improve quality and cost-effectiveness of care. He supports greater use of comparative effectiveness research to provide an evidence-base for improved resource allocation decisions.
Over considerable opposition from within his own party, the President supports an Independent Medicare Advisory Board modeled after the commission that recommends military base closings. The Congressional Budget Office gave the President little credit for this in the scoring numbers. Yet this change could have a potentially revolutionary impact on Medicare policy–which is exactly why so many pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, many medical specialties, and many elected politicians are unhappy with this measure.
Some of these measures are buried in the fine print. Others were included despite deep opposition from self-avowed fiscal conservatives whose concern for the federal budget precisely stops at the boundaries of their own states or their own favored constituencies. (The most powerful cost-control measure, a strong public option, was brought down by Republicans, insurers, and virtually the entire supply-side of the medical economy, but that is another story.)
These obvious realities underscore the second reason why the Post’s argument is so irksome. Although the House and Senate bills include many specific elements favored by (for example) officials in the last Bush administration, Republicans have made a basic strategic decision to filibuster and to vote in lockstep against the signature policy initiative of the Obama Presidency.
As a result, President Obama needed to corral every single Democratic vote to pass the signature measure of his presidency. The President was willing to deal on tort reform and other difficult matters. Although the gang of six talked interminably, no Republicans were willing to deal.
Proposed piecemeal, the cost-control measures already contained in the President’s proposal would command little public or interest-group support. These measures would command little enthusiasm from a Congress freed from the fiscal constraints required to pass a comprehensive bill that simultaneously provides critical benefits to millions of people.
The Post seems oblivious to the fact that defeat of the President’s comprehensive reform would damage any future cost-control effort. Interest groups that oppose specific measures–certainly including the “Cadillac tax” –would cite this defeat in discouraging politicians from supporting similar efforts. They would cite the success of crudely demagogic “death panel” rhetoric to deter serious measures to improve the quality and economy of Medicare services.
Progressive politicians desperate to help millions of uninsured people would learn from this episode that the smart move is to propose a politically attractive package of benefits without offsetting spending reductions or taxes to pay for it. I would hardly blame them.
Then there is the third reason. The Post writes: “We think that it is not asking too much, given the dire fiscal straits, for Washington to show that it can swallow distasteful medicine while, and not after, it passes out the candy.”
No candy is being distributed here. The bill whose survival is at stake is not some pork-barrel agriculture or weapons bill. After decades of failure, this bill would provide critical protection for 50 million uninsured people. It would help millions of others facing medical bankruptcy because they are underinsured or because they have serious illnesses leading them to exceed lifetime insurance caps that would be immediately ended under the President’s proposal.
This very morning, our local Catholic church presented an appeal from a family whose infant son was diagnosed with Hemophagocytic Lymphohistiocytosis, a rare and deadly disease. As the costs of his care approach $1 million, the family has established a website appealing for help. They have no plan B. There is no plan B for states, either, which desperately need this bill to avoid even more dire fiscal difficulties than are projected for the federal government.
The President has spent the past year, and has risked much of his presidency, to address these critical needs. After this bill is passed, he and the Congress should pursue further serious cost-containment efforts. The current bill provides the best platform to do this.
There is a moral urgency to passing this bill. The President, House and Senate leaders might have done more to cut costs if they had even secured one or two moderate Republican votes. They had to cut some messy deals to get this done. There were good reasons to do so. Against heavy odds and several decades of failed efforts, President Obama and his allies are close to getting this done. By fetishing a single imperfect aspect of the President’s proposal, the Post mischaracterizes the policy dilemma. The Post also misses the magnitude of what is at stake.
By: Harold Pollack- the Helen Ross Professor of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago and a Special Correspondent for The Treatment-The New Republic, March 7, 2010
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