Three Reasons Why It’s Better For The Economy If The Super-Committee Fails To Get A Deal
Last Thursday’s Washington Postheadline blared: “Debt panel’s lack of progress raises alarm on Hill.”
In fact it is far better for everyday Americans if the so-called Super Committee fails entirely to get a deal.
The overarching reason is simple: any deal they are likely to strike will make life worse for everyday Americans — and worsen our prospects for long-term economic growth.
Of course that’s not the view of many denizens of the Capitol who are still obsessed by the notion that it is critical for the Congress to produce a “compromise” that raises revenue and cuts “entitlements.” There are three reasons why these people are wrong:
1). Any deal would likely slash the income of many everyday Americans. You could design a plan to substantially reduce the deficit without big cuts in Social Security, Medicare or Medicaid. My wife, Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, who served on President Obama’s Fiscal Commission, designed just such a proposal last year. And, of course, Social Security has nothing to do with the deficit in the first place.
Unfortunately, however, in order to get Republican support any large-scale deal in the Super Committee would almost certainly require big cuts in either Social Security, Medicare or Medicaid — or all of them. Substantial cuts in any of these programs will make life harder for everyday Americans and reduce the likelihood of long-term economic growth.
Without a “deal” in the Super Committee, the current budget plan does not cut Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid — and that’s a good thing.
According to the Social Security Administration, the average monthly Social Security check now averages the princely sum of $1,082 — or about $13,000 per year. Next year, for the first time since 2009, payments will increase by $39 per month to offset inflation, but $18 a month of that increase will go right back out the door in the form of Medicare premium increases.
Already under current law, Medicare Part B premiums, that cover services like doctors, outpatient care and home health services, must be set annually to cover 25% of program costs. And remember that Medicare recipients aren’t getting an “entitlement” — they are getting an earned benefit that they paid for throughout their working lives. The same, of course, is true of Social Security.
Mean while, Medicaid is the principle means of assuring that America actually begins to provide health care for all — including nursing home and home care.
The problem with medical care costs isn’t that “greedy” seniors and others are gobbling up too much care. The problem is that the costs of providing care are going up too fast. In fact, the per capita costs of providing health care in America is 50% higher than anywhere else on earth, and the World Health Organization only ranks health care outcomes as 37th, in the world.
Medicare is actually the most efficient means in the American economy for providing health care. Any action by the “Super Committee” that reduces the percentage of Americans on Medicare — say, by raising the eligibility age from 65 to 67 — would cost the American economy.
- According to a study by the Kaiser Family Foundation, if such a proposal were operational in 2014 it would raise total health care spending in America by $5.7 billion per year.
- This is so because, while it would save the Federal government a net of about $5.7 billion ($24 billion savings in Medicare payments largely offset by $18 billion of increased Medicaid payments and subsidies to low-income participants in exchanges), it would also generate an additional $11.4 billion in higher health care costs for individuals, employers and states — resulting in a net cost to the economy of $5.7 billion.
The one thing you could do to cut Medicare costs without hurting ordinary families or the economy as a whole is to require Medicare to negotiate with the drug companies for lower prices the same way the Veterans Administration does today. That would cut hundreds of billions in costs to the government over the next ten years, but don’t expect the Republicans to include that as an acceptable cut in “entitlements” as part of a Super Committee deal.
Of course, America has no business cutting the income of seniors who get $13,000 a year in Social Security payments regardless of anything else that is in a deal. The deficit problem should be fixed by asking millionaires and billionaires to pay their fair share and by jobs plans that put America back on a path of sustained economic growth. And we have no business reducing access to health care for everyday people so that CEO’s can fly around in their corporate jets, oil companies can keep their tax breaks, or Wall Street hot shots — who we all bailed out just three years ago — can pack in their huge bonuses.
Even if a Super Committee proposal includes increases in revenue to the government from millionaires and billionaires, that is not reason that normal people — whose real incomes have dropped over the last decade — should also be called upon to “share in the sacrifice.”
The problem isn’t that everyday Americans are gorging themselves on excesses that “America can’t afford.” The problem is that Wall Street, the financial sector and the 1% have gobbled up all of the increases in economic growth that the country has produced over the last two decades.
That has meant that the standard of living for normal people has been stagnant. But just as problematic, it has lead to a stagnant economic growth. Since the incomes of everyday people haven’t increased at the same rate as increased worker productivity, there simply haven’t been enough new customers to buy the new products and services that American businesses produce. That is the formula for recession and depression. And that’s just what happened.
American corporations are sitting on two trillion dollars of cash. The reason they aren’t hiring has nothing to do with the need for more tax breaks. What stops them isn’t lack of “confidence,” it’s a lack of customers.
For decades the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has preached the need for fiscal constraint and austerity. According to the Washington Post, now even the IMF is warning that, “austerity may trigger a new recession, and is urging countries to look for ways to boost growth.
If you want to lay a foundation for long-term economic growth in America, the last thing you would do is reduce the income going to ordinary Americans — even over the long run. That’s not the problem — just the opposite. We do not need ordinary people to “share in the sacrifice.” We need policies that will increase the share of income going to ordinary people and reduce the exploding inequality between the 99% and the 1%.
Any deal in the Super Committee will almost certainly do just the opposite.
2.). The worst effects of sequestration could be solved without a “grand bargain”. The one big downside of a failure of the Super-Committee to act would be the level of discretionary spending cuts that would be required through the resulting sequestration. This is particularly true of cuts in education funding.
The budget deal that was struck in order to prevent Republicans from plunging America into default last summer requires an additional $1.2 trillion reduction in the deficit over the next ten years. If the Super Committee fails to agree on the distribution of these cuts, they will automatically be spread over defense and non-defense segments of the budget beginning in 2013. But there would be no cuts in Social Security, Medicare or Medicaid.
Congress would have the ability to adjust these sequestration requirements between now and 2013, regardless. But the “fast track” authority that would require up or down votes on a proposal from the “Super Committee” would expire if the Committee cannot reach agreement by November 23rd.
The best solution to the problem of big cuts in discretionary spending would be to put together a smaller deal to raise some revenue and reduce cuts in discretionary and – if necessary — military spending — after the mandate of the Super Committee has expired.
The Congress will have a year to help solve this problem, and the pressure to ameliorate some of the cuts in military spending that have so far proved ineffective at forcing Republicans to consider big revenue increase, may be more persuasive when it comes to smaller increases as the actual date of sequestration (2013) draws near.
Of course it’s possible that the Super Committee itself could come with a small-bore deal of this sort, simply to avoid the full force of sequestration. But that would be very different than a $1.2 trillion dollar package that includes cuts in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. Progressives should avoid cuts to these programs at all costs, because any cuts that sliced Social Security, Medicare or Medicaid benefits would require changes in the structure of the programs themselves that would last forever. Cuts in discretionary spending — as bad as they might be — are one-time events and do not fundamentally change the structure of the American social contract.
3). There is no reason for Congress to fear that its failure to act on a “Super Committee” agreement will have massive adverse consequences on “market confidence,” since the level of the deficit will not be affected. That has already been set — with a mandate for a $1.2 trillion cut. The Wall Street gang and the ratings agencies might sputter something about government dysfunction for a day or two. But the fundamentals will not be affected, since the level of government borrowing won’t be affected by whether or not there is a deal.
It’s also worth noting that even after Standard and Poor’s downgraded the U.S. debt because of the process leading up to the debt ceiling deal, it had no effect on the interest rates the government is paying for bonds. In fact those interest rates dropped to record lows. U.S. government debt remains the safest investment in the world, no matter what S&P did, and the market reflected that indisputable fact.
In other words then, Congress does not have its back against the wall like it did during the debt ceiling “hostage” crisis. When it came to the debt-ceiling deadline, failure was not an option. In the case of the “Super Committee” failure to come to an agreement is a very real option — in fact, it’s the best option.
There are some in Congress — most notably in the Senate — who truly believe that what the country needs is a “grand bargain” that cuts the deficit by making ordinary people “share in the sacrifice” even if millionaires and billionaires are asked to share some as well.
Hopefully those who are working for such bargain will be thwarted by two important political realities.
First, that cuts in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid are politically toxic. People get really angry when you take away something they have earned.
Second, the Republican’s stubborn unwillingness to give an ounce of new revenue from the pockets of millionaires and billionaires – who, after all, are the true core constituency of the Republican Party.
This time a little “gridlock” may be a good thing.
State Loan Program That Rick Perry Touted Had To Be Bailed Out
Gov. Rick Perry has anchored his presidential campaign to his claims of creating jobs.
With no business record of his own, Perry must contrast his ability to create jobs with public money against the records of two front-runners, Mitt Romney and Herman Cain, who tout credentials as private employers.
His GOP opponents already have sniped at his gubernatorial record, saying Perry inflates his job-creation numbers and takes credit for a business climate he inherited. Perry’s efforts to create jobs and spur agribusinesses as the state’s agriculture commissioner during the 1990s might provide even more fodder for the opposition.
Over his eight years as Texas’ farmer-in-chief, Perry oversaw a loan guarantee program with so many defaults that the state had to stop guaranteeing bank loans to startups in agribusiness and eventually bailed out the program with taxpayer money.
The state auditor panned Perry’s claims of creating jobs and criticized Perry and his fellow board members at the Texas Agricultural Finance Authority for not following their own lending guidelines.
In some instances, the auditor said, Perry and the authority guaranteed loans to applicants with a negative net worth or too much debt. Citing growing debts, the auditor finally suggested that state officials consider dismantling the program.
Even as the first alarms were sounded, Perry defended the program, saying no taxpayer money was at risk, blaming others and claiming he had fixed it.
It only got worse.
By 2002, Perry’s successor, Agriculture Commissioner Susan Combs, a Republican, stopped making loans as the percentage of bad loans neared 30 percent.
By 2009, her successor, Agriculture Commissioner Todd Staples, also a Republican, asked the Legislature to pay off the loan guarantees with a $14.7 million appropriation. The finance authority could no longer afford the $541,000 to cover the annual interest on the bad debts, almost all of which dated back to Perry’s tenure.
“It’s bad,” Staples told the American-Statesman at the time. “Unfortunately, taxpayers are on the hook for something that happened as long ago as 1987.”
In effect, Perry, as governor, signed his own government bailout when he approved the 2009 appropriations bill.
The Perry campaign did not respond to questions about whether Perry, as president, would use public money in economic development programs and what lessons he learned from his experience guaranteeing risky business loans with public money.
Mired in partisan politics
When the Legislature created the Texas Agricultural Finance Authority in 1987, the intent was to boost the state’s agricultural economy by selling state-backed bonds to guarantee bank loans to entrepreneurs who could not get commercial loans. The goal was to create small businesses and jobs by processing — rather than simply growing — Texas agricultural products.
The program immediately got mired in partisan politics, with Agriculture Commissioner Jim Hightower, a Democrat, on one side, and the Republican members of the finance authority appointed by Gov. Bill Clements on the other.
The impasse ensured that no loans were made during Hightower’s term.
In 1990, Perry campaigned on a promise to create jobs and expand the rural economy by making loans to agribusiness startups that would process the state’s agricultural products.
Clements’ appointees to the finance authority board gave Perry, a board member, sole authority to guarantee loans before newly elected Gov. Ann Richards, a Democrat, could replace them.
Under the program, the state would guarantee 90 percent of a lender’s loan — up to a maximum of $5 million — to an applicant.
Entrepreneurs lined up for money to spin cotton into yarn, process meats, develop cotton insulation, market canna bulbs to wholesale nurseries and sell pinto beans as a ready-to-eat frozen meal, to name a few.
‘This has not cost Texans money’
Perry had made four loan guarantees for $5.8 million by the time the attorney general ruled that he had to share that authority with his fellow board members. Even then, Perry and his staff drove the decisions.
Mary Webb, a Richards appointee who joined the finance authority as chairwoman in 1992, said the part-time board members had to rely on Perry’s staff at the agriculture department when screening loan applications.
“They did the legwork,” she said. “We looked at the deals to see if they fit with the legislation: Would they create jobs and help the agriculture community?”
By the time Webb left the board in 1995, she said she knew a couple of loans were in trouble. She said she learned only later the scope of the problems with other loans.
The first loan guarantees were financed by selling $25 million in bonds.
Twice, in 1993 and 1995, Perry campaigned for voters to approve more bonding authority.
Perry claimed the first two years of the program had created 4,100 jobs and pumped $390 million into the economy by guaranteeing loans to 47 companies. He predicted more than 40,000 jobs could be created with the additional bonding authority.
He didn’t mention troubled loans as he touted the program’s virtues at a 1993 Capitol press conference: “We think that this Texas Ag Finance Authority is, without a doubt, one of the finest programs that the Texas Legislature, that the citizens of Texas have ever gone forward with.”
At another stop, Perry said, “We can truly say it has not cost the taxpayers of Texas any money.”
Voters turned him down in 1993, but Perry finally won an extra $200 million in bonding authority two years later.
“This is one of the few government programs that truly has worked,” Perry said. “This has not cost Texans money.”
In January 1997, State Auditor Lawrence Alwin first alerted state officials, saying Perry and the board had violated their own lending guidelines.
He said 10 of the 48 companies had defaulted, and six more were in trouble. The first bad loans were written off as uncollectible in 1995, according to records.
Alwin also debunked a $40,000 report by a state-paid consultant claiming the program had created or retained more than 5,000 jobs at a cost of $412 per job as well as contributing $600 million to the economy.
The consultant’s data, which Perry submitted to the Legislature, were “unverifiable, incomplete, untimely, and inconsistent” and based on unrealistic assumptions about job creation, Alwin concluded.
A year later, Alwin warned that the situation had gotten worse. The program was $5.7 million in the red because of bad loans.
The issue hit the newspapers.
Perry and his lieutenants defended the program.
Deputy Agriculture Commissioner Larry Soward told The Dallas Morning News that the audit reflected a number of bad loans made early in the program to farmers and ranchers trying their first business ventures.
“The business acumen of the people behind them might not have been as strong as possible,” Soward said.
But he insisted the program would rebound: “The fact that there is a negative balance does not mean the program is in trouble.”
Perry echoed a similar refrain in a guest column in the Amarillo Daily News.
“By their very nature, TAFA loans are considered higher risk. Because of this, some defaults were inevitable and a negative balance was expected in the early years of the program,” he wrote.
He blamed the problems on “some unfortunate decisions made by the previous TAFA board early in the program.”
Perry promised the problem was fixed. “Today, TAFA is on solid footing with a positive balance projected by 2010,” he wrote.
He reminded readers that the loans were funded by debt — commercial paper: “No taxpayer money has ever been used to make TAFA loans.”
In 1998, Perry was elected lieutenant governor, and Combs succeeded him as agriculture commissioner.
She talked of expanding the loan guarantee program to other borrowers beyond food and fiber processors. But she asked Alwin to do a follow-up audit.
His warning was prescient. He said a program that guaranteed loans to people who typically couldn’t qualify for commercial loans would have a hard time finding enough good loans to generate the income to offset the losses from the bad ones.
In 2002, Combs and the agricultural finance authority bowed to that reality, suspending any new loans.
Twenty-nine of 102 guaranteed loans defaulted, almost all of them during Perry’s tenure, according to the records provided this month by the agriculture department.
While the majority of the loans were in good standing, the majority of the original $25 million — $14.7 million — was bad debt. Just as the auditor warned, the income from the good loans could not generate enough cash to make the program self-sustaining.
“We hit a brick wall,” Staples said in 2009.
By: Laylan Copelin, American-Statesman Staff, Statesman.com, October 22, 2011
The GOP’s Latest Tax Gimmickry: Soak The Poor
It’s one of the strangest things in our politics: The only “big” ideas Republicans and conservatives seem to offer these days revolve around novel and sometimes bizarre ways of cutting taxes on rich people.
Given all the attention that Herman Cain’s nonsensical and regressive 9-9-9 tax plan has received, the Republican debates should have as their soundtrack that old Beatles song that droned on about the number nine.
Now, Texas Gov. Rick Perry hopes to pump up his campaign with a supposedly bold proposal to institute a flat tax, which would also deliver more money to the well-off. Perry plans to outline his proposal this week, but he has already touted it as a sure-fire way of “scrapping the 3 million words of the current tax code.”
There is absolutely nothing new about this idea, and candidates who pushed flat taxes in the past saw their campaigns flat-line, most prominently businessman Steve Forbes in 1996 and again in 2000. Politically, the idea falls apart rather quickly when middle-income voters realize that its main effect is to cut taxes on the financially privileged while usually raising them on Americans who have more modest incomes.
Note to Perry: Voters are shrewd in figuring out whether tax proposals really benefit them. That’s why raising taxes on millionaires — the exact opposite of what Cain and Perry want to do — wins support from a broad majority.
But the more interesting question is: Why are today’s Republicans so enthralled by tax gimmicks? Their party, after all, was once innovative in thinking about affirmative uses of government. The Grand Old Party instituted the Homestead Act and created land-grant colleges, the interstate highway system, student loans, the Pure Food and Drug Act and even a prescription drug benefit under Medicare.
It was Richard Nixon who supported laws establishing the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In signing the OSHA bill, Nixon called it “one of the most important pieces of legislation, from the standpoint of 55 million people who will be covered by it, ever passed by the Congress of the United States, because it involves their lives.” Yes, government regulations save lives, a view now heretical in the GOP.
Republicans have boxed themselves into a rejection of both their own traditions and the idea that government can do any good. Thus they have confined themselves to endless fiddling with the tax code. Almost everything conservatives suggest these days is built around the single idea that if only government took less money away from the wealthy, all our problems would magically disappear.
There is a history to this. The Republican fixation on taxes dates to the mid-1970s, when supply-side economics began taking hold. The late Jude Wanniski, an editorial writer for the Wall Street Journal who campaigned indefatigably on behalf of lower marginal tax rates, came up with the “Two Santa Clauses” theory. He argued that if Democrats earned support by giving voters benefits through government programs, Republicans should play Santa by giving people tax cuts.
Wanniski sold his tax ideas to Jack Kemp, one of the most ebullient political figures of his generation, who in turn sold them to Ronald Reagan. Reagan made Kemp’s 30 percent tax cut (co-sponsored with Sen. Bill Roth) a centerpiece of his 1980 campaign. The political scientist Wilson Carey McWilliams perfectly described the result in a 1981 essay. “After years of learning that ‘you don’t shoot Santa Claus,’ ” he wrote, “the Republicans decided to nominate him.”
But Republicans have a problem now. In the Kemp-Reagan days, they were selling across-the-board tax cuts. Most of their benefits flowed to the rich, but almost everyone got a piece. Today, many Republicans complain resentfully that less prosperous Americans don’t pay enough in taxes — overlooking the fact that citizens who don’t pay income taxes still shell out a significant share of their earnings in payroll, sales and (directly or through their rents) property taxes.
Reagan’s optimism has thus been replaced by crabby put-downs of the less affluent. Perry said it directly in his announcement speech: “We’re dismayed at the injustice that nearly half of all Americans don’t even pay any income tax.” Considering the other injustices in our society, this seems an odd and mean-spirited obsession.
“Tax the poor” is a lousy political slogan. That’s why Cain’s 9-9-9 plan and Perry’s flat tax are doomed to fail. Among conservatives, Santa Claus has given way to Scrooge.
By: E. J. Dionne, Opinion Writer, The Washington Post, October 21, 2011
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