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Judge Vinson’s Tea Party Manifesto

Mark Hall, Fred and Elizabeth Turnage Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law

On first read, the most striking aspect of Judge Vinson’s ruling today is not its remedy — striking the Affordable Care Act in its entirety — but the impression one gets that the opinion was written in part as a Tea Party Manifesto.  At least half of the relevant part of the opinion is devoted to discussing what Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson and other Founding Fathers would have thought about the individual mandate, including the following remarkably telling passage (p. 42):

It is difficult to imagine that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of opposition to a British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place.

As I’ve written elsewhere, the same Founders wrote a Constitution that allowed the federal government to take property from unwilling sellers and passive owners, when needed to construct highways, bridges and canals.  But Judge Vinson dismissed those and other examples with the briefest of parenthetical asides:  “(all of [these] are obviously distinguishable)” (p. 39).    Instead, he twice cites and quotes the lower court opinion in Schechter Poultry (pp. 53, 55), which struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act, at the height of the Great Depression and the pinnacle of Lochner jurisprudence.

Still, it’s fair enough to conclude, absent controlling precedent, that being uninsured might not constitute interstate commerce.   What’s harder to swallow is the judge’s rejection of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  In refusing to sever the individual mandate, he not only concedes the mandate “is indisputably necessary to the Act’s insurance market reforms, which are, in turn, indisputably necessary to . . . what Congress was ultimately seeking to accomplish,” he astonishingly devotes about ten pages (63-74) to hammering home the mandate’s necessity, explaining, for instance, that:

this Act has been analogized to a finely crafted watch . . . . It has approximately 450 separate pieces, but one essential piece (the individual mandate) is defective and must be removed. It cannot function as originally designed. There are simply too many moving parts in the Act and too many provisions dependent (directly and indirectly) on the individual mandate and other health insurance provisions — which, as noted, were the chief engines that drove the entire legislative effort — for me to try and dissect out the proper from the improper

So if the mandate is so clearly necessary, why is it not “proper.”  The answer, as in Virginia’s Judge Hudson’s opinion, is a virtual tautology:  because the Commerce Clause does not permit it.  Here are critical excerpts:

the Clause is not an independent source of federal power (p. 58) . . . Ultimately, the Necessary and Proper Clause vests Congress with the power and authority to exercise means which may not in and of themselves fall within an enumerated power, to accomplish ends that must be within an enumerated power. (p. 60)

In light of [United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters], the “end” of regulating the health care insurance industry (including preventing insurers from excluding or charging higher rates to people with pre-existing conditions) is clearly “legitimate” and “within the scope of the constitution.” But, the means used to serve that end must be “appropriate,” “plainly adapted,” and not “prohibited” or inconsistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” . . . The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be utilized to “pass laws for the accomplishment of objects” that are not within Congress’ enumerated powers.  (p. 62)

The defendants have asserted again and again that the individual mandate is absolutely “necessary” and “essential” for the Act to operate as it was intended by Congress. I accept that it is.   Nevertheless, the individual mandate falls outside the boundary of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority and cannot be reconciled with a limited government of enumerated powers. By definition, it cannot be “proper.”  (p. 63)

My full rebuttal is here, but in brief: none of this is consistent with Comstock, which allows the federal government to commit mentally ill former prisoners to civil treatment, despite the clear absence of any general federal civil commitment power.  And this is inconsistent with Lopez and with Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Raich, which note that regulation, otherwise forbidden, of local noneconomic activities, can be justified when this is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”  Thus, we still await a convincing explanation of why rejecting the “necessary and proper” defense is consistent with recent Supreme Court opinions, authored or joined by most of the conservative justices.

By: Professor Mark Hall, Health Reform Watch, January 31, 2011

February 6, 2011 Posted by | Affordable Care Act, Health Reform | , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Judge Vinson’s Health Care Smackdown: What’s A Tea Party Without Tea Leaves?

 In his spare time, U.S. District Judge Roger Vinson, the author of Monday’s sweeping ruling  gutting as “a bridge too far” the entirety of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, apparently serves as the president of the board of directors of the American Camellia Society, an industrious group that evidently appreciates and nurtures a tiny, colorful corner of God’s Green Earth. The camellia is known around the world not just as a plant that produces beautiful flowers — it is the state flower of Alabama, for example — but also as a plant that produces tea leaves. And what’s a Tea Party, after all, without a healthy supply of tea leaves?

It cannot be a coincidence, then, that Judge Vinson, the Reagan appointee who has chosen reverence to the camellia as a hobby, would choose to compare (unfavorably, even) the Obama Administration’s complicated (and increasingly endangered) effort to bring health insurance to 30 million Americans with the efforts of King George III and the British East India Company to tax the tea the colonials quoffed.

“It is difficult to imagine,” Judge Vinson wrote in his 78-page ruling, “that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of opposition to a British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place.”

Tea Party analogy? Check. Head-scratching analysis? Check. Judge Vinson wrote:

“… the mere status of being without health insurance, in and of itself, has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce (not ‘slight,’ ‘trivial,’ or ‘indirect,’ but no impact whatsoever) — at least not any more so than the status of being without any particular good or service. If impact on interstate commerce were to be expressed and calculated mathematically, the status of being uninsured would necessarily be represented by zero. Of course, any other figure multiplied by zero is also zero. Consequently, the impact must be zero, and of no effect on interstate commerce.

The uninsured can only be said to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce in the manner as described by the defendants: (i) if they get sick or injured; (ii) if they are still uninsured at that specific point in time; (iii) if they seek medical care for that sickness or injury; (iv) if they are unable to pay for the medical care received; and (v) if they are unable or unwilling to make payment arrangements directly with the health care provider, or with assistance of family, friends, and charitable groups, and the costs are thereafter shifted to others.”

Got that? The uninsured can only have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce” — and thus be regulated by Congress — if they are subject to the precise conditions which exist today all over the country, and which prompted the Act in the first place. The judge acknowledges this point, to his credit, saying that the Congress would of course have the power to regulate the millions of people who meet his five criteria above. But he then concludes: “But, to cast the net wide enough to reach everyone in the present, with the expectation that they will (or could) take those steps in the future, goes beyond the existing ‘outer limits’ of the Commerce Clause” (emphasis in original).

I suspect there will be a million words of legal and political analysis over the logic and viability of that conclusion.

Unsolicited and simplistic recommendations for the legislative branch? Also check. Judge Vinson wrote: “If Congress intends to implement health care reform — and there would appear to be widespread agreement across the political spectrum that reform is needed — it should do a comprehensive examination of the Act and make a legislative determination as to which of its hundreds of provisions and sections will work as intended without the individual mandate, and which will not.” In other words: Try again, Congress, and good luck with that!

Painfully half-hearted expression of regret for kicking the entire Affordable Care Act to the curb? Check. Judge Vinson wrote: “I must reluctantly conclude that Congress exceeded the bounds of its authority in passing the Act with the individual mandate. That is not to say, of course, that Congress is without power to address the problems and inequities in our health care system. The health care market is more than one sixth of the national economy, and without doubt Congress has the power to reform and regulate this market. That has not been disputed in this case. The principal dispute has been about how Congress chose to exercise that power here” (emphasis added).

I am sure that others, including some of my colleagues here at the Atlantic, will be spending time in the coming hours and days further parsing the ruling. For me, for now, it’s enough to say that Judge Vinson delivered for opponents of the Act precisely what he had promised them one month ago in open court in the motion hearing; a epic, hero-to-a-cause ruling that somehow makes U.S. District Judge Henry Hudson’s ruling last month in Virginia, which also struck down the “individual mandate,” seem like a relative exercise in judicial restraint. And that’s saying something.

Two federal trial judges (Democratic appointees both) have declared the law valid. Now two federal trial judges (Republican appointees both) have declared the law invalid. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court — and by that I mean swing-voter Justice Anthony Kennedy, who also is a Reagan appointee — will decide. But no matter what happens from here on in, Judge Vinson, lover of flowers and tea-leaf-reader by choice, has just ensured himself at least one more day in the sun.

By: Andrew Cohen -The Atlantic-January 31, 2011: Andrew Cohen has served as chief legal analyst and legal editor for CBS News and won a Murrow Award as one of the nation’s leading legal analysts and commentators.

February 1, 2011 Posted by | Affordable Care Act, Individual Mandate | , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

   

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