Gaming the System: At The Supreme Court, Could Legal Precedent Be Less Important Than Popular Opinion?
Articles of faith, as a rule, don’t change every few months. And yet, just nine months ago, it was an article of faith among court watchers that President Obama’s health care reform plan would be upheld at the Supreme Court by a margin of 7-2 or 8-1. Today it is an equally powerful article of faith that everything rests in the hands of Justice Anthony Kennedy in what will surely be a 5-4 decision. What changed between last March and last Monday?
To review: When the first lawsuits were filed challenging the law in March 2010, the conventional wisdom was that they were little more than a Tea Party stunt. “Several constitutional law experts said this week that it is somewhere between unlikely and hard-to-imagine that the Supreme Court would strike down the new healthcare law,” wrote David Savage at the Los Angeles Times. He quoted George Washington University law professor Orin Kerr, a former Kennedy clerk, saying that “there is a less than 1 percent chance that the courts will invalidate the individual mandate.” In Newsweek in September 2010, Stuart Taylor quoted Walter Dellinger, acting solicitor general under President Clinton, predicting an 8-1 vote at the high court, and Tom Goldstein, another prominent court watcher and litigator, calling for a vote of 7-2.
Fast forward to this week. As my colleague David Weigel put it Monday: “The fate of health care reform is where it was yesterday—in the hands of Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy.” The Wall Street Journal agreed, sighing, “As with so many contentious issues in American life, destiny appears to have appointed [Kennedy] the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of the linchpin of this new law: the individual mandate.” Now, the composition of the court has not changed since last year. Nor has the meaning of the Commerce Clause, or the decades of precedents interpreting that doctrine, or the words of the Affordable Care Act itself. The only thing that has shifted between the filing of the Obama health care suits and Judge Roger Vinson’s decision finding the entire bill unconstitutional is the odds. We went from “a less than 1 percent chance” of the suits succeeding to their success being determined by a coin flip in Anthony Kennedy’s chambers.
Putting aside the question of whether it matters what court watchers think—or whether the new odds should make any difference—it’s astounding to witness the conventional wisdom shift so dramatically and so rapidly. It took years for court watchers to take challenges to the collective-rights theory of the Second Amendment seriously. It’s taken just weeks for them to come to believe that the fate of the health care law may be decided by a single vote.
To those in the business of making predictions about the Supreme Court justices, one thing that did change was a smoke signal sent up by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia last month in a passionate dissent from the court’s refusal to hear a case from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Alderman v. United States involved the right of the federal government to criminalize a violent felon’s purchase of body armor. And as Andrew Cohen explained it, the two justices weren’t obligated to publish a lengthy dissent, spelling out—complete with references to Hershey’s Kisses (the new broccoli?)—their view that the Commerce Clause does not allow the federal government to make such a regulation. Their small treatise on the limits of the Commerce Clause’s power, Cohen wrote, “confirms to the world that no more than seven votes on the Supreme Court are still in play over the constitutionality of the federal health care measure.”
Court watchers have long argued that Scalia cannot possibly square his vote (indeed his own words) in the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich with a vote to strike down health care reform. Once they read the Thomas/Scalia dissent in Alderman, they had to swallow hard. In Raich, Scalia agreed that Congress could regulate marijuana that was neither purchased nor sold in any market but grown for medicinal reasons at home. “The authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,” Scalia wrote. “Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.” He added that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.”
These words matter a lot to supporters of health care reform. But it’s no longer clear how much they matter to Justice Scalia.
Simon Lazarus has a thoughtful post about all the ways in which the court’s more conservative justices—not just Scalia but also Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts—”will have to twist their prior decisions and statements into pretzels in order to rule the individual mandate or other ACA provisions unconstitutional.” Reading Raich against the Alderman dissent, I am not sure all the justices are terribly bothered at the prospect of performing such gymnastics. Supreme Court reporters like to believe that the justices are invariably hemmed in and pinned down by their prior decisions, and in a perfect world they might be. But if we learned anything at all from Bush v. Gore, it’s that in landmark cases with huge symbolic stakes, justices on both sides of the aisle can get all kinds of creative.
If that is the case, then in the coming months we should pay less attention to the words of Raich and more to the political scientists and judicial behavior theorists who have a lot to say about how justices decide cases. What really changed between last March and this week is that in making predictions about what happens to health care reform, we have almost entirely stopped talking about the law or the Constitution and begun to think solely in terms of strategic judicial behavior.
Court watchers on both sides of the debate seem to agree that Vinson’s opinion was rooted more in his convictions about the need to restrain federal overreaching than in the court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents. The question now seems to be less about whether the justices can find a way to strike down the law if they so choose—they can—than whether they have the political stomach to do it.
I am not an expert on judicial stomachs. But it seems to me that once you start thinking strategically about how health care reform will fare at the Supreme Court, pretty soon you arrive at some serious questions about the continued legitimacy of the court, judicial responses to public sentiment, and other matters that have far more to do with social psychology than Wickard v. Filburn.
Everyone would like to believe that the kind of constitutional issues presented in these health care suits are clear and specific. But they are precisely the sort of wide-open normative inquiries that may tempt even great and fair jurists to have a little extra-textual fun. “American constitutional lawyers, whether practitioners, academics or judges, seem to feel relatively few genuine constraints in the kinds of arguments they are willing to make or endorse,” professor Sanford Levinson has written. “It is, I am convinced, harder to recognize a frivolous argument in constitutional law than in any other area of legal analysis.”
If the odds of success for the health care challenges have tilted in recent months, it’s not because the suits themselves have somehow gained more merit. It’s because the public mood and the tone of the political discourse have shifted dramatically—emboldening some federal judges willing to support a constitutional idea whose time, in their view, has finally come. Whether this sea change will affect the Supreme Court remains to be seen. At least on paper, the Supreme Court is immune to whatever the odds makers are saying about the law’s chances. If recent weeks have shown us anything, however, it’s that what’s on paper doesn’t matter as much as we think it does in the nation’s courts.
By: Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, February 2, 2011
Judge Vinson’s Tea Party Manifesto
Mark Hall, Fred and Elizabeth Turnage Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law
On first read, the most striking aspect of Judge Vinson’s ruling today is not its remedy — striking the Affordable Care Act in its entirety — but the impression one gets that the opinion was written in part as a Tea Party Manifesto. At least half of the relevant part of the opinion is devoted to discussing what Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson and other Founding Fathers would have thought about the individual mandate, including the following remarkably telling passage (p. 42):
It is difficult to imagine that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of opposition to a British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place.
As I’ve written elsewhere, the same Founders wrote a Constitution that allowed the federal government to take property from unwilling sellers and passive owners, when needed to construct highways, bridges and canals. But Judge Vinson dismissed those and other examples with the briefest of parenthetical asides: “(all of [these] are obviously distinguishable)” (p. 39). Instead, he twice cites and quotes the lower court opinion in Schechter Poultry (pp. 53, 55), which struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act, at the height of the Great Depression and the pinnacle of Lochner jurisprudence.
Still, it’s fair enough to conclude, absent controlling precedent, that being uninsured might not constitute interstate commerce. What’s harder to swallow is the judge’s rejection of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In refusing to sever the individual mandate, he not only concedes the mandate “is indisputably necessary to the Act’s insurance market reforms, which are, in turn, indisputably necessary to . . . what Congress was ultimately seeking to accomplish,” he astonishingly devotes about ten pages (63-74) to hammering home the mandate’s necessity, explaining, for instance, that:
this Act has been analogized to a finely crafted watch . . . . It has approximately 450 separate pieces, but one essential piece (the individual mandate) is defective and must be removed. It cannot function as originally designed. There are simply too many moving parts in the Act and too many provisions dependent (directly and indirectly) on the individual mandate and other health insurance provisions — which, as noted, were the chief engines that drove the entire legislative effort — for me to try and dissect out the proper from the improper
So if the mandate is so clearly necessary, why is it not “proper.” The answer, as in Virginia’s Judge Hudson’s opinion, is a virtual tautology: because the Commerce Clause does not permit it. Here are critical excerpts:
the Clause is not an independent source of federal power (p. 58) . . . Ultimately, the Necessary and Proper Clause vests Congress with the power and authority to exercise means which may not in and of themselves fall within an enumerated power, to accomplish ends that must be within an enumerated power. (p. 60)
In light of [United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters], the “end” of regulating the health care insurance industry (including preventing insurers from excluding or charging higher rates to people with pre-existing conditions) is clearly “legitimate” and “within the scope of the constitution.” But, the means used to serve that end must be “appropriate,” “plainly adapted,” and not “prohibited” or inconsistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” . . . The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be utilized to “pass laws for the accomplishment of objects” that are not within Congress’ enumerated powers. (p. 62)
The defendants have asserted again and again that the individual mandate is absolutely “necessary” and “essential” for the Act to operate as it was intended by Congress. I accept that it is. Nevertheless, the individual mandate falls outside the boundary of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority and cannot be reconciled with a limited government of enumerated powers. By definition, it cannot be “proper.” (p. 63)
My full rebuttal is here, but in brief: none of this is consistent with Comstock, which allows the federal government to commit mentally ill former prisoners to civil treatment, despite the clear absence of any general federal civil commitment power. And this is inconsistent with Lopez and with Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Raich, which note that regulation, otherwise forbidden, of local noneconomic activities, can be justified when this is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” Thus, we still await a convincing explanation of why rejecting the “necessary and proper” defense is consistent with recent Supreme Court opinions, authored or joined by most of the conservative justices.
By: Professor Mark Hall, Health Reform Watch, January 31, 2011
What Happens If Conservatives Succeed in Undermining The Affordable Care Act?
The legal theory currently in vogue in conservative circles holds that the Constitution’s vision of “a central government with limited power” — to use Judge Vinson’s phrase — permits the government to establish a single-payer health-care system that every American pays into through payroll taxes and that wipes out the private insurance industry but forbids the government from administering a regulated market in which individuals purchase private insurance plans and pay a penalty if they can afford coverage but choose to delay buying it until they’re sick.
There’s a chance conservatives will come to seriously regret this stratagem. I think it’s vanishingly unlikely that the Supreme Court will side with Judge Vinson and strike down the whole of the law. But in the event that it did somehow undermine the whole of the law and restore the status quo ex ante, Democrats would start organizing around a solution based off of Medicare, Medicaid, and the budget reconciliation process — as that would sidestep both legal attacks and the supermajority requirement.
The resulting policy isn’t too hard to imagine. Think something like opening Medicare to all Americans over age 45, raising Medicaid up to 300 percent of the poverty line, opening S-CHIP to all children, and paying for the necessary subsidies and spending with a surtax on the wealthy (which is how the House originally wanted to fund health-care reform). That won’t get us quite to universal health care, but it’ll get us pretty close. And it’ll be a big step towards squeezing out private insurers, particularly if Medicaid and Medicare are given more power to control their costs.
By: Ezra Klein-The Washington Post, January 31, 2011
Judge Rules Against Reform, Ignores Facts
Federal Judge Roger Vinson has ruled against the Affordable Care Act, striking down not just the individual mandate but the rest of the law, as well. Vinson had made his skepticism of the law very clear during oral argument, so the ruling isn’t surprising, although his decision to invalidate the entire statute goes farther than the decision by Judge Henry Hudson, the federal judge who invalidated the law last last year.
Vinson did not halt implementation of the law. (That would have been surprising.) And, to be clear, two other federal judges have ruled the law is constitutional while about a dozen more have dismissed lawsuits without even hearing. The final word, almost certainly, will come from the Supreme Court. And it could be two years before a case reaches that far.
I’ve only skimmed the decision very quickly. Once I’ve read it more carefully, I’ll (hopefully) have more intelligent things to say. But, at first glance, two things leap out at me.
Defenders of the Affordable Care Act (myself among them) argue that the power to impose the mandate lies in two parts of the Constitution: the power to levy taxes and the power to regulate interstate commerce. Vinson rejects the tax argument and, in explaining his rationale, suggests that even the two judges who upheld the mandate agreed with him on this. But this is incorrect. Judge George Steeh, the federal judge from Michigan, declared that the tax argument was “without merit.”
The other striking thing about Vinson’s ruling is his reasoning on interstate commerce–and its apparent ignorance of policy reality. Vinson says the mandate is unconstitutional because, in effect, the link between insurance status and interstate commerce is too weak:
…the mere status of being without health insurance, in and of itself, has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce (not “slight,” “trivial,” or “indirect,” but no impact whatsoever) — at least not any more so than the status of being without any particular good or service. [Emphasis in original]
Again, this is just wrong, as anybody who understands the health care market will tell you. From my January article on the case:
When doctors and hospitals give uncompensated care to people without insurance, these providers of care pass along higher prices to everybody else who pays, and those higher prices show up as either larger taxes, larger insurance premiums, or larger out-of-pocket expenses. In addition, if people know they can get insurance even if they have pre-existing conditions, some will wait until getting sick before buying insurance. That upsets the delicate actuarial balance of insurance plans, which depend on premiums from healthy people to offset the costs of the sick. Premiums end up rising even more.
Researchers at the nonpartisan Urban Institute, which has developed its own mathematical model of the health care market, have run simulations on how the Affordable Care Act would play out without the individual mandate. They found that an additional 18 million people would end up without insurance. Jonathan Gruber, an MIT economist and respected authority in his own right, determined that without a mandate, premiums for people buying coverage on their own would be 27 percent higher. Gruber has advised health care reformers, including the architects of the Affordable Care Act. But the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office got similar results from its calculations. And while economic models can certainly be wrong, these results are consistent with real-world experience: In those states where laws already require insurers to sell to anybody but insurance enrollment is not compulsory, premiums have gone way up.
Again, I’ll have more to say soon. In the meantime, keep in mind that the plaintiffs got the results they wanted in part because they got the judge they wanted. Bill McCollum, Florida’s attorney general, and his allies didn’t file the case before the federal court in Tallahassee. They filed the case in nearby Pensacola. I assume (although I can’t be sure) that’s because it increased their chances of getting a conservative judge, like Vinson.
In any event, it’s just one decision among several. And it ultimately matters only insofar as the Supreme Court decides to embrace it.
By: Jonathan Cohn-The New Republic, January 31, 2011
The Importance of the Individual Mandate — Evidence from Massachusetts
The most contentious aspect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the individual mandate requiring that most documented U.S. residents obtain health insurance or pay a tax penalty. Many experts have long advocated a mandate as a central pillar of private-sector–based health care reform. Others, however, have argued that a mandate is not necessary for successful reform.
Proponents of the mandate argue that it is necessary to reduce adverse selection in a reformed nongroup insurance market. Adverse selection occurs when a larger fraction of relatively unhealthy people than healthy people purchase health insurance. It is analogous to the purchase of car insurance only by high-risk drivers (or worse, only by drivers who have just had an accident). However, one of the most popular aspects of the ACA may encourage such adverse selection, since the law prohibits health insurers from discriminating against applicants on the basis of health, either by charging higher premiums for sick people or by excluding preexisting conditions from coverage. Absent other reforms, such regulations would theoretically increase premiums for healthy people and lead them to exit the nongroup insurance market, which would cause premiums to rise even more. Informal support for this hypothesis comes from the fact that the five U.S. states with such regulations (known as “community rating”) are among the states with the highest nongroup insurance premiums.1
Opponents of the mandate counter that community rating may work as long as there are large subsidies that attract healthier enrollees to the insurance pool. Such subsidies include the tax credits that the ACA authorizes for people with incomes between 133 and 400% of the federal poverty level. (The federal poverty level for a family of four is about $22,000 per year.) States with community rating do not generally offer such large subsidies, so we can’t use their experience to predict the effects of national reform minus the mandate. But understanding whether the mandate matters, even with large subsidies in place, is critical for assessing its role in reform.
The early experience with health care reform efforts in Massachusetts may offer some lessons. Massachusetts made heavily subsidized insurance available to residents with incomes below 300% of the federal poverty level for nearly a year before mandating insurance coverage. By examining the characteristics of the subsidized insurance pool before and after the mandate went into effect, we assessed how much of an additive effect the mandate had over that of simply offering subsidized, community-rated insurance.
As part of the Massachusetts reform, the Commonwealth Care program provided free insurance to people with incomes below the federal poverty level from October 2006 onward and for those with incomes below 150% of the federal poverty level from July 2007 onward. In both cases, the state automatically enrolled people who were eligible for free coverage; people in higher income groups could enroll but had to pay premiums. We therefore examined the behavior of Massachusetts residents with incomes between 150 and 300% of the poverty level, who were eligible for subsidies and had to pay insurance premiums that were meaningful but much smaller than those mandated by the ACA.
Using claims data from the Massachusetts Commonwealth Connector, we measured the health mix of the population enrolling in Commonwealth Care according to average age, average monthly health care expenditures, and the proportion of enrollees with a chronic illness. We identified enrollees as having a chronic illness if within the first 12 months after enrollment they had an office visit at which a diagnosis of hypertension, high cholesterol level, diabetes, asthma, arthritis, an affective disorder, or gastritis was recorded.2 Relying on only the first 12 months of claims ensured that our estimates of rates of chronic illness for earlier enrollees, whose claims data covered a longer period, were similar to estimates for later enrollees.
We examined these data for the period from March 2007 (the date of the first available reliable information on people with incomes in the relevant range) through June 2008 (the last month for which we could calculate our 12-month measure of chronic illness). In each month, we measured the health of the enrollees who joined the program.
We assessed the characteristics of these enrollees before, during, and after the phasing in of the mandate. Technically, the mandate went into effect on July 1, 2007. The Connector began a massive public outreach campaign in May 2007, and the number of hits on its Web site peaked around July 1. The penalty, however, was assessed on the basis of insurance coverage as of December 31, 2007. That is, people who purchased insurance in November that began in December did not have to pay the penalty, even if they had been uninsured beyond July 1. The penalty for 2007 was the loss of the individual state income tax exemption, a relatively modest $219. It increased to about $900 in 2008 and was prorated on the basis of the number of months of coverage during the year.
Characteristics of New Enrollees in Commonwealth Care, According to Enrollment Period
Number of Enrollees in Commonwealth Care, According to Chronic-Illness Status
It seems possible that even without the mandate, people with the highest health care costs would enroll first and healthier people would enroll over time. But data on the health status of new enrollees suggest that that was not the case (see graph). At the beginning of the mandate’s phase-in in mid-2007, there was a greater increase in the number of healthy enrollees than in the number of enrollees with chronic illness. When the mandate became fully effective at the end of 2007, there was an enormous increase in the number of healthy enrollees and a far smaller bump in the enrollment of people with chronic illness. The gap then shrank to premandate levels as the remaining uninsured residents complied with the mandate, but clearly the mandate brought many more healthy people than nonhealthy ones into the risk pool. The large jump in healthy enrollees that occurred when the program became fully effective suggests that enrollment by the healthy was not simply slower than enrollment by the unhealthy, but rather that the mandate had a causal role in improving risk selection.
Whether the Massachusetts experience can be generalized to the rest of the country depends in part on the relative sizes of the subsidies provided: the higher the subsidies, the smaller the role for an individual mandate. Under Commonwealth Care, adults with incomes between 150 and 200% of the poverty level were asked to contribute $35 per month. Under the ACA, their monthly contribution would be $51 to $107. At 200 to 250% of the poverty level, the monthly contributions are $70 in Massachusetts and $107 to $171 under the ACA; at 250 to 300% of the poverty level, the contributions are $105 in Massachusetts and $171 to $242 under the ACA. The larger subsidies in Massachusetts would be expected to have a greater effect in inducing healthy people to obtain insurance than the ACA’s smaller subsidies — which suggests that mandating coverage might well play an even larger role in encouraging the healthy to participate in health insurance markets nationally than it has in Massachusetts.
By: Amitabh Chandra, Ph.D., Jonathan Gruber, Ph.D., and Robin McKnight, Ph.D.-New England Journal of Medicine | This article (10.1056/NEJMp1013067) was published on January 12, 2011, at NEJM.org.
Source Information
From the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (A.C.), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (J.G.) — both in Cambridge, MA; and Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA (R.M.).
References
- Rosenbaum S, Gruber J. Buying health care, the individual mandate, and the Constitution. N Engl J Med 2010;363:401-403Full Text | Web of Science | Medline
- Goldman DP, Joyce GF, Escarce JJ, et al. Pharmacy benefits and the use of drugs by the chronically ill. JAMA 2004;291:2344-2350CrossRef | Web of Science | Medline
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