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How To Kill A Recovery-Republican Style

The economic news has been better lately. New claims for unemployment insurance are down; business and consumer surveys suggest solid growth. We’re still near the bottom of a very deep hole, but at least we’re climbing.

It’s too bad that so many people, mainly on the political right, want to send us sliding right back down again.

Before we get to that, let’s talk about why economic recovery has been so long in coming.

Some economists expected a rapid bounce-back once we were past the acute phase of the financial crisis — what I think of as the oh-God-we’re-all-gonna-die period — which lasted roughly from September 2008 to March 2009. But that was never in the cards. The bubble economy of the Bush years left many Americans with too much debt; once the bubble burst, consumers were forced to cut back, and it was inevitably going to take them time to repair their finances. And business investment was bound to be depressed, too. Why add to capacity when consumer demand is weak and you aren’t using the factories and office buildings you have?

The only way we could have avoided a prolonged slump would have been for government spending to take up the slack. But that didn’t happen: growth in total government spending actually slowed after the recession hit, as an underpowered federal stimulus was swamped by cuts at the state and local level.

So we’ve gone through years of high unemployment and inadequate growth. Despite the pain, however, American families have gradually improved their financial position. And in the past few months there have been signs of an emerging virtuous circle. As families have repaired their finances, they have increased their spending; as consumer demand has started to revive, businesses have become more willing to invest; and all this has led to an expanding economy, which further improves families’ financial situation.

But it’s still a fragile process, especially given the effects of rising oil and food prices. These price rises have little to do with U.S. policy; they’re mainly because of growing demand from China and other emerging markets, on one side, and disruption of supply from political turmoil and terrible weather on the other. But they’re a hit to purchasing power at an especially awkward time. And things will be much worse if the Federal Reserve and other central banks mistakenly respond to higher headline inflation by raising interest rates.

The clear and present danger to recovery, however, comes from politics — specifically, the demand from House Republicans that the government immediately slash spending on infant nutrition, disease control, clean water and more. Quite aside from their negative long-run consequences, these cuts would lead, directly and indirectly, to the elimination of hundreds of thousands of jobs — and this could short-circuit the virtuous circle of rising incomes and improving finances.

Of course, Republicans believe, or at least pretend to believe, that the direct job-destroying effects of their proposals would be more than offset by a rise in business confidence. As I like to put it, they believe that the Confidence Fairy will make everything all right.

But there’s no reason for the rest of us to share that belief. For one thing, it’s hard to see how such an obviously irresponsible plan — since when does starving the I.R.S. for funds help reduce the deficit? — can improve confidence.

Beyond that, we have a lot of evidence from other countries about the prospects for “expansionary austerity” — and that evidence is all negative. Last October, a comprehensive study by the International Monetary Fund concluded that “the idea that fiscal austerity stimulates economic activity in the short term finds little support in the data.”

And do you remember the lavish praise heaped on Britain’s conservative government, which announced harsh austerity measures after it took office last May? How’s that going? Well, business confidence did not, in fact, rise when the plan was announced; it plunged, and has yet to recover. And recent surveys suggest that confidence has fallen even further among both businesses and consumers, indicating, as one report put it, that the private sector is “unprepared to fill the hole left by public sector cuts.”

Which brings us back to the U.S. budget debate.

Over the next few weeks, House Republicans will try to blackmail the Obama administration into accepting their proposed spending cuts, using the threat of a government shutdown. They’ll claim that those cuts would be good for America in both the short term and the long term.

But the truth is exactly the reverse: Republicans have managed to come up with spending cuts that would do double duty, both undermining America’s future and threatening to abort a nascent economic recovery.

By: Paul Krugman, Op-Ed Columnist, The New York Times, March 3, 2011

March 4, 2011 Posted by | Budget, Economy, Jobs, Politics | , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Make-Believe Billion: How Drug Companies Exaggerate Research Costs To Justify Absurd Profits

For years the government has sought to make brand-name drugs cheaper and more widely available to the public. It has tried and failed to limit to a reasonable time period various patent and other “exclusivity” protections. Or it’s tried and failed to negotiate volume discounts on the drugs that the feds purchase through Medicare. Every time, the pharmaceutical lobby has used its considerable wealth and political clout to block any government action that might trim Big Pharma’s profits, which typically amount to between one-quarter and one-half of company revenues. And just about every time, Big Pharma has argued that huge profit margins are vitally necessary to the pharmaceutical industry because drug research and development costs are so high.

The statistic Big Pharma typically cites (see, for instance, this PhRMA video on how Mister Chemical Compound becomes Mister Brand-Name Drug) is that the cost of bringing a new drug to market is about $1 billion. Now a new study indicates the cost is more like, um, $55 million.

Big Pharma has been making its R&D argument for half a century, but the specific source of the $1 billion claim is a 2003 study published in the Journal of Health Economics by economists Joseph DiMasi of Tufts, Ronald W. Hansen of the University of Rochester, and Henry Grabowski of Duke. I will henceforth refer to this team as the Tufts Center group, because they were working out of the (drug-company-funded) Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development. The Tufts Center group “obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms” the research and development costs of 68 randomly chosen new drugs and calculated an average cost of $802 million in 2000 dollars. That comes to $1 billion in 2011 dollars based on the general inflation rate since 2000 (28 percent). One billion dollars for every little orange prescription bottle in your medicine cabinet! And according to PhRMA, even that is way too low! As of 2006, its calculation of the drug-development average had already risen to $1.32 billion. That means costs specific to drug development increased by 64 percent between 2000 and 2006. Medical inflation typically outpaces general inflation, but PhRMA’s calculation puts its rate of cost increase at more than twice the rate for medical inflation during that period (26 percent). If Pharma’s alleged inflation rate hasn’t slackened since 2006, then the drug-development average should be now approaching $2 billion. But let’s not go there. We’ll stick to Big Pharma’s official last-stated estimate of $1.32 billion.

The new study, by sociologist Donald W. Light of the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and economist Rebecca Warburton of the University of Victoria, and published in the journal BioSocieties, builds on some excellent previous research by journalist and health care blogger Merrill Goozner, author of The $800 Million Pill, and the consumer advocate Jamie Love. Light and Warburton begin by pointing out that drug companies submitted their R&D data to the Tufts Center group on a confidential basis and that these numbers are therefore unverifiable. Light and Warburton find it a little fishy that only 10 of the 24 invited firms chose to participate, given “the centrality of the issue and the prominence of the Center” within the industry. “The sample,” they suggest, “could be skewed” toward companies or drugs “with higher R&D costs.” Light and Warburton also observe that if the Tufts Center group made any effort of its own to verify the information it received from the drug companies, the group makes no mention of it in the study.

The first research phase involved in developing a new drug is basic (as opposed to applied) research. Very little of this type of research is funded by drug companies; 84 percent is funded by the government, and private universities provide additional, unspecified funding. The Tufts Center group assumed that drug companies spent, on average, $121 million on basic research to create a new drug, but Light and Warburton find that hard to square with their estimate that industry devotes only 1.2 percent of sales to all their basic research. Add in a few additional considerations and Big Pharma would have us believe basic research costs end up constituting more than one-third of the Tufts Center’s $802 million estimate. That’s way too much, Light and Warburton say.

Another problem Light and Warburton have with the Tufts Center group is that they didn’t subtract from their R&D calculations pharmaceutical firms’ tax breaks. Research and development costs, they point out, are not depreciated over time like other investments; rather, they’re excluded entirely from taxable profits. This tax break lowers net costs by 39 percent. Add in other tax breaks and that cuts the Tufts Center group’s R&D estimate in half.

Now take that figure and cut it in half again, Light and Warburton say, because half the Tufts Center group’s estimate was the “cost of capital,” i.e., revenue foregone by not taking the money spent on R&D and investing it in securities instead. But R&D is a cost of doing business, Light and Warburton point out; if you don’t want to spend money on it, then you don’t want to be a drug company. And who says that investing in securities always increases your capital? Sometimes the market goes down. Many of us learned that the hard way in 2008.

There are other problems. The Tufts Center group’s per-subject calculation of how much clinical trials cost was six times that of a National Institutes of Health study. Its calculation of how much time it takes to conduct clinical trials and have them reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration—7.5 years—is twice as long as Light and Warburton’s calculation, which is less than four years. The Tufts Center group’s use of the average (mean) cost rather than the median cost, Light and Warburton argue, is also misleading, because R&D costs for different drug products vary widely, and a very few expensive drugs will skew the mean. That appears to have happened in this case, because the Tuft Center group’s median was only 74 percent of the mean.

When Light and Warburton correct for all these flaws—well, all the ones that can be quantified—they end up with an average cost of bringing a drug to market that’s $59 million and a median cost that’s $43 million. In 2011 dollars, that’s a $75 million average and a $55 million median.

So the drug companies’ $1.32 billion estimate was off, according to Light and Warburton, by only $977 million. Let’s call it a rounding error.

By: Timothy Noah, Slate-March 3, 2011

March 4, 2011 Posted by | Big Pharma, Pharmaceutical Companies | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

   

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