“The New Politics Of Nostalgia”: Political Schizophrenia Is A Poor Guide To The Future
A specter is haunting the affluent societies of the West. Across the rich countries, and across the political spectrum, there is an unstated but palpable longing for a return to the 1950s.
This ’50s nostalgia takes different forms on the left and on the right. For progressives, the backward-looking wish is for the shared and growing prosperity when unions thrived and could enforce a relatively egalitarian social contract. Democrats in the United States and Social and Christian Democrats in Europe created systems of social insurance — they were more robust in Western Europe — that were largely endorsed by political conservatives.
On the right, ’50s nostalgia takes the form of a quest for order, social homogeneity, religious faith — or, at the least, public respect for traditional values — and strong families, sometimes defined as a return to old gender roles and a less adventurous approach to sexuality.
Neither side fully acknowledges its own nostalgia, partly because everyone wants their 1950s a la carte. The left, for example, will not brook any retreat from gender, racial or ethnic equality, any abridgement of sexual freedom or civil rights, any re-imposition of cultural conformity. The right wants no revival of inhibitions on the rambunctiousness of liberated economies and hails the decline of unions and their capacity to get in the way of labor-market dynamism.
And nostalgia for the 1950s can also split the left and the right, or create a kind of political schizophrenia. Globalization, for example, is often applauded by the left for obliterating nationalism and giving rise to an expansive and less parochial consciousness. Yet the left can also disdain the power that globalization confers on multinational corporations and the way it undercuts the bargaining clout of workers who must now compete with each other across national boundaries.
The right, particularly the more economically libertarian in its ranks, likes the way globalization diminishes the ability of national governments to enforce rules, taxes and bureaucratic inhibitions on the market. Yet many traditional conservatives dislike the free flows of immigration that globalization has let loose. They long for a firmer sense of national identity, and the kind of solidarity more homogenous societies can foster.
Worries about immigration run deep in parts of the Republican Party and pushed Mitt Romney to positions that have left him with an anemic share of the Latino vote. In the Netherlands, where politics has tended toward the pragmatic, the moderate and the practical, worries about Islamic immigration roiled the system and gave rise to the Party for Freedom, the PVV, headed by the 49-year-old Geert Wilders. Pragmatism made a comeback Wednesday as the PVV was projected to lose about half of its seats in Dutch elections.
In one sense, all of the nostalgia can be boiled down to a simple proposition: In the 1950s, most Americans and most Western Europeans had confidence that their children would do better than they had done, that they would grow up to prosper in a stable society with a growing economy. The collapse of this certainty is the prime cause of discontent, left, right and center.
In the end, of course, nostalgia is a dangerous form of politics and a kind of lie. The fact that left and right alike are ambivalent about the 1950s, albeit in different ways, suggests that bringing them back whole is not in the cards.
And it’s not possible, which is why nostalgia is always a poor guide to the future. The effects of globalization can be mitigated, but the economic developments of the last three decades cannot be repealed by fiat. The vast changes in communications technology that simultaneously bind people together and make it easier for them to retreat into their own social and political circles will not be rolled back. I see no mass movement that will get people in large numbers to toss their iPhones into the rubbish.
But understanding politics now requires an appreciation for the nostalgic roots of our current struggles. It’s not hard to understand the yearning of many of Romney’s supporters for past cultural certainties. Obama’s coalition is, in cultural terms, the coalition of the future — younger, and both ethnically and racially diverse. Yet Obama’s core pledge is to a new social compact that provides many of the guarantees of the old one.
Thus the choice in 2012 may be, more than we realize, about which parts of the 1950s we yearn for most, and whether there is any way to bring back the best aspects of an old era while leaving the rest of it behind.
By: E. J. Dionne, Jr., Opinion Writer, The Washington Post, September 13, 2012
“Republicans At Risk”: Tea Party And John Birch Society Are One And The Same
When James Hoffa, president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, looks at the Tea Party today, he flashes back to 1964 and sees the John Birch Society.
“The Tea Party, these right wingers are basically the modern-day John Birch Society,” he told U.S. News. “They are being extremists.”
The John Birch Society gained traction in the early 60s with its vehemently anti-communist rhetoric and distrust in government.
Hoffa says just like in the early 60s when the John Birch Society pushed for Barry Goldwater, who was the more conservative candidate, to be the Republican presidential nominee, the Tea Party has forced the GOP further to the right.
“It’s just like in 1964 when Goldwater ran against Johnson and the John Birch society was calling the shots.”
Hoffa says the strong voice of the Tea Party in Congress has forced the Republican leadership to ignore party centrists, which ultimately could put Republicans at risk among the general electorate this November.
“These people are so far to the right that they are putting themselves off of the field,” Hoffa says.”The Republican party and the Romney, Ryan combo have veered so far to the right that they have lost their credibility on almost any issue.”
But while Hoffa insists their ideas are too radical for the country, the one advantage that the Republicans have these days, Hoffa says is a financial one.
Hoffa argues the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Citizens United case, which allowed people to donate unlimited amounts of campaign cash in the name of free speech, gave Republicans an edge and left the party vulnerable to being held hostage to radical far-right interests.
“We cannot have one person underwriting an entire campaign,” Hoffa says.
Republicans have countered the argument by accusing the Teamsters of dumping millions into elections on behalf of Democrats.
According to the Sunlight Foundation, a group that tracks election spending, public sector unions alone have spent $139 million in the election so far.
While the Teamsters are big donors, Hoffa says it’s an unfair comparison.
“There is no million dollar guy on the Teamsters giving money,” he says. “Everyone puts in $50 or $20 and they find a way to get the job done.”
By: Lauren Fox, Washington Whispers, U. S. News and World Report, September 4, 2012
“The Republican War On Labor”: Workers Face An Economic Power Gap
On Labor Day 2012, U.S. workers are in dire straits, and an increasing share of elite opinion says it’s their own damned fault.
Not quite so bluntly, of course. But it’s impossible to read the business press and the editorial pages without encountering the argument that the economy hasn’t perked up because of the “skills gap.” U.S. workers, this thinking goes, just don’t have the skills required by our advanced economy. If only our workers and schools were better, if only teachers unions ceased to exist, all would be well.
There are indeed some skills-gap problems plaguing the economy, but the downward mobility of U.S. workers results far more from their lack of power than their lack of skills.
Since the recession bottomed out in June 2009, median household income has fallen by $2,544, to $50,964 — a 5 percent drop — according to a new report by Sentier Research. It’s no mystery why wages are falling even during the recovery. In a study released last week, the National Employment Law Project found that 58 percent of the jobs created since 2010 pay between $7.69 and $13.83 an hour. New jobs in the mid-range of the wage distribution, paying $13.84 to $21.13, account for just 22 percent of the positions created since the recovery began, though they constituted 60 percent of the jobs lost in the downturn. Higher-wage jobs are just 20 percent of the newly created positions. The biggest increase in jobs has come in food preparation and retail sales.
These numbers underscore the question of whether our primary problem is the lack of skills or, rather, the lack of good jobs. And the problem isn’t just that mid-range jobs were offshored or fell prey to the construction bust. It’s also the declining or stagnating wages and benefits in a far wider range of sectors — even where U.S. workers have the skills they need and then some.
Is it really insufficient education that’s dragging down Americans? Since 1979, the share of U.S. workers with college degrees has increased from 19.7 percent to 34.3 percent, the Center for Economic and Policy Research found this summer. Yet the percentage of college graduates with good jobs — which the center defines as jobs paying at least $37,000 and providing health insurance and some kind of retirement plan — had declined from 43 percent in 1979 to 40 percent in 2010.
Are American workers becoming less productive? On the contrary, a Wall Street Journal survey of the Standard & Poor’s 500, the nation’s largest publicly traded companies, found that their revenue per worker increased from $378,000 in 2007 to $420,000 in 2010. The problem is that workers get none of that increase. As economists Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon have shown, all productivity gains in recent decades have gone to the wealthiest 10 percent of Americans, in sharp contrast to the three decades following World War II, when Americans at all income levels shared in the productivity increases.
The primary plight of U.S. workers isn’t their lack of skills. It’s their lack of power. With the collapse of unions, which represented a third of the private-sector workforce in the mid-20th century but just 7 percent today, workers simply have no capacity to bargain for their share of the revenue they produce.
This is not to say that there is no skills gap or that U.S. schools don’t need improvement. But the decline of unions has both weakened workers’ bargaining power and diminished the kind of apprenticeship programs that the building trades unions have long (and ably) provided. Under increasing right-wing pressure to justify their very existence, however, some unions in other sectors are embarking on skills training or professional development programs.
The most notable is that of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which has created an interactive professional development Web site for teachers called Share My Lesson in response to school districts cutting back on their ongoing teacher education. “Teachers want and need to share best practices with each other,” AFT President Randi Weingarten told me, so her union is rolling out this site as the school year begins.
Unions can address the skills gap just as, in the days when they were larger, they could address the economic power gap. But if the war that business and Republicans are waging on labor isn’t defeated, good jobs will continue to dwindle and work in America will grow steadily less rewarding.
And a happy Labor Day to you.
By: Harold Meyerson, Opinion Writer, The Washington Post, September 2, 2012
“Deregulation And Worker’s Bargaining Power”: New Insight Into The Decline Of The Middle Class
The recently released 2012 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Employment Outlook provides new insights into the decline of the middle class. The report documents the global shift from labor income to profits. Across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, known as OECD, the share of income going to wages, salaries, and benefits—labor’s share—declined over the last 20 years. The median labor share in OECD countries fell from 66.1 percent to 61.7 percent of national income. However, the decline in labor compensation was not equally shared by all employees; the wage share of top income earners increased while low-paid workers were hardest hit. On average, the wage share of the top 1 percent of income earners increased by 20 percent over the past two decades.
In the United States, where labor’s share began its decline in the 1980s, it fell a further 2.5 percentage points over the past 20 years. Excluding top earners’ income, the decline in the adjusted labor share was 4.5 percentage points.
The decline in labor’s share of national income did not result from a shift away from labor intensive industries to industries that employ a low share of labor. The OECD’s analysis found overwhelmingly that it is within-industry declines in labor’s share of industry value added that explains the fall in labor’s share. On average, the OECD found, real wage growth within industries did not keep pace with productivity growth.
Examining the causes of the decline in labor’s share, the OECD found that labor-saving technical change across most industries was associated with greater investment in capital and higher productivity growth as machines replaced workers in some jobs. The OECD found a strong association between technical change and the decline in labor’s share. It is important not to be hasty and jump to the conclusion that technological unemployment is to blame for the decline in labor’s share. In fact, the OECD did not find fewer jobs overall for less-educated workers.
Rather, what they found is not a decline in low-skill jobs, but a decline in jobs that pay middle-class wages. The share of the high-skilled in occupations such as manager or IT engineer increased as did jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution, typically low-paid precarious jobs. Unfortunately, this increase in demand and employment of workers in low-paying occupations did not improve the earnings of these workers. Increasingly, better-educated workers who in the past would have found middle-class jobs ended up low-paid employment. The OECD found that educational requirements increased quickly in low-pay occupations and that “workers in these jobs tend to be overqualified” (p. 124). A recent report from the Center for Economic and Policy Research found this to be true in the United States, where 43 percent of low-wage workers have some college or a college degree, 27 percent have a high school degree, and only 20 percent did not graduate from high school.
What, then, explains the failure of real wages to grow in line with productivity growth, and for increased educational attainment to translate into middle-class earnings? The evidence points to the negative effects of deregulation of some industries and increased globalization on workers’ bargaining power.
Deregulation of industries such as energy, transportation, and communication in which union density had traditionally been high opened these industries to new enterprises staffed by non-union workers. Increasing globalization—the delocalization of some parts of the supply chain as well as import competition from low-wage countries for blue-collar workers (but, notably, not for doctors, lawyers, and other high-paid workers) has led to the loss of well-paid unionized jobs. Both of these developments have led to a reduction in workers’ bargaining power vis a vis employers and have weakened unions, leaving workers to fend for themselves and employers to fix wages individually. The result according to the OECD has been to “decrease the bargaining power of workers, particularly those who are low-skilled, and thus their ability to appropriate their share [of productivity gains].”
The unequal distribution of labor income—with nearly all the gains in wages going to the top 1 percent while earnings stagnated or declined for the 99 percent—has gone hand-in-hand with the decrease in the share of national income going to labor and the shift from labor income to profits. Absent a countervailing force that enables workers to share fairly in the economy’s productivity gains, the decline in labor’s share appears likely to continue.
By: Eileen Appelbaum, Washington Whispers, U. S. News and World Report, August 25, 2012
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