Teaparty, More Dumb Than Clever
Although I’m not part of the Tea Party movement and I don’t share its values, I usually understand what its followers are trying to do. But their latest gambit on health care has me genuinely baffled.
The idea is to oppose the Affordable Care Act not in the Congress or the courts, where they’ve been fighting so far, but in the state legislatures. As you may recall, the Act calls upon states to create the new “exchanges,” through which individuals and small businesses will be able to buy regulated insurance policies at affordable prices. The simplest way to do that is for state legislatures to pass laws creating exchanges that conform to the Act’s standards. Several states have started that process already–and a few, like California, are well along in their efforts.
But Tea Party activists have been lobbying state lawmakers to vote against such measures and, in a few states, it looks like they’re succeeding. Politico’s Sarah Kliff has the story:
In South Carolina, tea party activists have been picking off Republican co-sponsors of a health exchange bill, getting even the committee chairman who would oversee the bill to turn against it.
A Montana legislator who ran on a tea party platform has successfully blocked multiple health exchange bills, persuading his colleagues to instead move forward with legislation that would specifically bar the state from setting up a marketplace.
And in Georgia, tea party protests forced Gov. Nathan Deal to shelve exchange legislation that the Legislature had worked on for months.
It’s a great idea for blocking the law, except for one small problem: The Affordable Care Act anticipates that some states might not create adequate exchanges. And the law is quite clear about what happens in those cases. The federal government takes over, creating and then, as necessary, managing the exchanges itself. In other words, if state lawmakers in Columbia, Helena, and Atlanta don’t build the exchanges, bureaucrats in Washington are going to do it for them.
I realize that blocking the exchange votes may have certain symbolic value–and, at least in the early going, it could complicate implementation simply by generating more chaos. (Georgia lawmakers, as the article suggests, had already put in a lot of time on theirs.) I also gather that some Tea Party activists believe that blocking state exchanges will strengthen the constitutional case against the law. Still, if even part of the law withstands both congressional repeal and court challenges, as seems likely, the long-term effect of this Tea Party effort seems pretty clear: It will mean even more, not less, federal control.
The irony here is that, throughout the health care debate, liberals like me wanted federal exchanges, in part because we feared states with reluctant or hostile elected officials would do a lousy job. That’s the way exchanges were set up in the House health care reform bill and, in January of 2010, many of us hoped the House version would prevail when the two chambers negotiated the final language in conference committee. But the conference negotiation never took place, because Scott Brown’s election eliminated the Democrats’ filibuster-proof majority. The House ended up passing the more conservative Senate bill, which had state exchanges, and that became the law.
Of course, not all Republicans agree with the Tea Party’s approach. In a previous article, for Politico Pro, Kliff interviewed several state officials who said they were setting up exchanges, notwithstanding their opposition to the law, precisely because it is the surest way to keep out the feds.
Len Nichols, the health care policy expert at George Mason University, thinks that approach makes a lot more sense, given their priorities:
Ironically, the only way to make PPACA a “federal takeover” is for states to do nothing. There is much state flexibility in the law, and much more could be sensibly negotiated and amended before 2014, but the strategy of repeal, do nothing and “get the government out of health care” will have exactly the opposite effect in those states that follow this path.
Maybe the Tea Party activists know something that neither Nichols nor I do. My bet, though, is that this effort is the policy equivalent of a temper tantrum, one that opponents of federalizing health care may come to regret.
By: Jonathan Cohn, The New Republic, March 31, 2011
The Affordable Care Act, One Year Later
A year ago this week, Capitol Hill was full of noise as the House of Representatives debated, and then voted, on the Affordable Care Act. But one of the most vivid memories of that experience for me was an extended moment of silence.
It came very late on Sunday evening–after the floor speeches, the votes, and the press conferences had ended. The galleries had long since emptied and the Capitol building itself was virtually unoccupied, so that it was possible to walk the entire length of the building, on the ground floor hallway that stretches from the House all the way to the Senate, without hearing so much as a single conversation.
It felt more than silent. It felt peaceful and, yes, satisfying. A prolonged, difficult debate had finally ended. It was time to move on.
Except that we haven’t moved on. We are still having arguments about health care reform. In fact, we are still having the same arguments about health care reform. The Affordable Care Act is law of the land now, yes, but its critics are determined to change that. And while the prospects of repealing it legislatively remain relatively slim, the prospects of repealing at least part of it judicially seem far more realistic than they did in the spring of 2010.
So perhaps it is worth taking a step back, just for a moment, and remembering how we got to this point–why this debate started in the first place and why it led to the enactment of this law.
It’s really not that complicated. Around one-fifth of the non-elderly population, or somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 million people, have no health insurance. Many millions more have insurance with major gaps or limitations, leaving them at risk of financial or medical catastrophe. Notwithstanding legitimate debates over exactly how many people go bankrupt or suffer physical hardship because they can’t pay their medical bills, virtually nobody denies that the human toll is real and significant.
These problems are the product, in part, a dysfunctional health insurance system that evolved haphazardly during the 20th Century. They also the product of a medical system as inefficient as it is costly. The United States pays more–far, far more–for health care than any other developed nation. But the care does not seem to be better overall, to say nothing of the fact that it is patently less available.
The goal of reform was really two-fold: In the short term, to make sure everybody can afford to pay for medical bills without financial distress; it the long term, to make the health care system as a whole more efficient, so that it no longer applied such a crushing financial burden on society. A single-payer system, like the ones in France or Taiwan, would have accomplished this. So would a scheme that turned health insurance into a regulated utility, as the Dutch and Swiss governments have done.
Political compromises, dating back to the earliest days of the 2008 presidential campaign, left the U.S. with a second-best–or, more accurately, a third- or fourth-best solution. It bolsters two existing insurance arrangements: Employer-sponsored coverage for workers in most companies, Medicaid for the very poor. It creates a new, regulated marketplace–insurance “exchanges”–for everybody else. Then, through a combination of tax changes and alterations to Medicare, it tries to reengineer medical care itself, wringing out administrative waste and focusing resources on the treatments, and care styles, that provide the most bang for the buck.
It’s easy to find the flaws–and to figure out who’s responsible for them. Doctors, hospitals, drug manufacturers, and device makers fought changes in the delivery of medical care that might affect their incomes; unions lobbied against tax reforms designed to discourage overly generous insurance; everyday Americans resisted changes to plans they already had. All of this blunted the Affordable Care Act’s efforts at cost control, which explains why, ten years from now, the best projections suggest we’ll have spent roughly as much on health care–as a government and as a country–as we would have if the law never passed.
At the same time, political conservatives fought to limit the bill’s expanse, demanding that the new outlays not exceed a $1 trillion, give or take. They had extra power, thanks to the filibuster, and were able to make the demand stick. As a result, the expansion of insurance coverage–via Medicaid and subsidies for private insurance–will not begin until 2014. Even then, somewhere around 20 million people, or 8 percent of the total population, will remain uninsured. And for some of the insured, the coverage will remain meager.
But the law’s shortcomings should not tarnish its many virtues. Eight percent uninsured means 92 percent insured, or around 95 of residents here legally. Or, to put it another way, more than 30 million additional people will have health insurance because of this law. The coverage, if not always as generous as it should be, will be enough to keep many if not most of the newly insured out of bankruptcy–and it will be available to almost everybody, regardless of pre-existing condition or insurance status.
The cost picture is also encouraging. The official projections suggest that, as of 2021, government spending (and, apparently, the country’s total spending) on health care will not be rising as fast as it is now. This is the critical distinction, because it’s the long-term burden of health care that threatens to bankrupt us. Critics doubt that officials will enforce planned changes to health care financing, but today’s lawmakers have no way to force action by their counterparts in the future. All they can do is put laws on the books–and that’s what they have done.
Are there better alternatives? Of course. But the loudest critics of the law, from the right, don’t have them. For all of their screaming, they have yet to put forward a credible plan that can do as much, let alone more, for less money. Their plans, stripped of misleading rhetoric, generally involve covering far fewer people, dramatically reducing the coverage that people have, or some combination of the two. Their dispute is not with the means Democrats have used to make health care affordable to all. It’s with the goal itself.
No, the way to improve the law is to build upon it–to bolster the insurance coverage, reach those Americans the law as written will not reach, and to strengthen the experiments in cost control that work. The best analysis of the law remains the one Senator Tom Harkin gave: The Affordable Care Act is not a mansion. It’s a starter home. But it’s got a solid foundation, a sturdy roof, and room for expansion.
A year from now, the presidential campaign will be well underway and the debate about the Affordable Care Act will likely be, if anything, more acrimonious than it is now. But perhaps after the election and, hopefully, after 2014, the country really will move on.
By: Jonathan Cohn, The New Republic, March 23, 2022
Mr. Obama’s Health Care Challenge-The Ball Is In Your Court GOP
President Obama had a splendid idea this week. He challenged governors who oppose his health care reforms, most of whom are Republicans, to come up with a better alternative. He has agreed to move up the date at which states can offer their own solutions and thus opt out of requirements that they oppose, like the mandate that everyone buy health insurance and that most employers provide it.
Let as many states as possible test innovative approaches to determine which works best.
The president told the nation’s governors on Monday that he supported a bipartisan bill — sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon, Scott Brown, Republican of Massachusetts, and Mary Landrieu, Democrat of Louisiana — that would allow states to fashion solutions right from the start of full-scale reform in 2014, rather than waiting until 2017, as the law requires.
The catch is that a state’s plan must cover as many people as the federal law does, provide insurance that is as comprehensive and affordable, and not increase the deficit. That won’t be easy for the governors to accomplish, and House Republicans seem unlikely to pass the bill to let them try. They would much rather repeal the reform law — or have it declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court — than join Mr. Obama in improving it.
The decision to set the date at 2017 was based on a desire to get the reform elements up and coverage greatly expanded before allowing states to start changing the law. There also were concerns that the early start would be more costly. That’s because the states would be given money for alternatives equal to the cost of insuring their citizens under health care reform. Without three years of experience to get firm figures, those block grants would probably be set too high.
Neither rationale still seems compelling. It would be wasteful to require states to set up exchanges and other elements of the reform only to abandon them for an alternative system three years later. The pending bill would wisely allow states to submit proposals in the near future and, if approved, put them into effect in 2014.
Alternative approaches might include replacing the mandate to buy insurance with a system to automatically enroll people in health plans, reformulating tax credits for small businesses and low-income individuals to encourage near-universal coverage, adopting such liberal approaches as a single-payer plan or a public option, and even moving all or part of the enrollees in Medicaid into new health insurance exchanges. These would all have to be done without driving up the federal deficit or reducing benefits, affordability and coverage.
Reaction among Republican governors has been mixed. The vast majority are focused on their immediate need to reduce Medicaid spending to help close their budget gaps, not on fashioning alternatives for 2014. For the near-term budget problems, the administration is already advising states on ways to reduce Medicaid costs and the president asked the governors to form a bipartisan group to work on further cost-reduction.
The president’s new olive branch is not apt to change the legal arguments over whether the mandate in the reform law is constitutional. But it can’t hurt to bring forcefully to everyone’s attention that there are alternatives to the mandate if states want to pursue them. Republicans ought to rise to the challenge.
By: The New York Times-Editorial, Published March 1, 2011
Do Republicans Really Oppose Making Health Care Insurance Cheaper?
The health-care debate has a cyclical nature, and I don’t want to keep writing the same posts over and over again. So rather than write a whole new piece on the GOP’s rediscovery of the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate that the health-care law will reduce the labor supply (which they recast as “destroying jobs”), I’ll just link to the long post I did on the subject in January.
In case you don’t want to click over, though, the short version is this: If you make health-care insurance cheaper and make it harder for insurance companies to deny people coverage, then a certain number of people who would like to leave the labor force but can’t afford or access health-care insurance without their job will stop working.
To understand why, imagine a 62-year-old woman who works for IBM and beat breast cancer 10 years ago. She wants to retire. She has the money to retire. But no one will sell her health care under the status quo. Under the health-reform law, she can buy health care in an exchange because insurers can’t turn her away due to her history of breast cancer. So she’ll retire. Or imagine a 50-year-old single mother who wants to home-school her developmentally disabled child but can’t quit her job because they’ll lose health care. The subsidies and the protections in the Affordable Care Act will give her the option to stop working for awhile, while under the old system she’d need to stick with her job to keep her family’s health-care coverage. That’s how health-care reform can reduce the labor supply. If either case counts as a destroyed job, then so does my winning the lottery and moving to Scotland in search of the perfect glass of whiskey.
Moreover, this would happen for any health-care reform that reduced costs and improved access. So when Republicans say that they want a better health-care reform bill that does even more to reduce costs, they’re calling for legislation that, according to them, would “destroy” even more jobs than the Affordable Care Act. If they’re against all legislation that might destroy jobs in this way, then they’re against making health care cheaper. In fact, by that logic, we could just jack the price of health-care insurance up and make it easier for insurers to turn individuals away. Then even more people would have to stick with their employers. Job creation!
By: Ezra Klein-The Washington Post, February 11, 2011
The Real Threat to Health Care Reform….It’s Not The Supreme Court
Will the Supreme Court overturn the part of the health-care law that penalizes people who don’t buy insurance for themselves? A few months ago, the answer that experienced Court-watchers gave was “not a chance.” Orin Kerr, a law professor at George Washington University who once clerked for Justice Anthony Kennedy, said “there is a less than 1 percent chance that the courts will invalidate the individual mandate.” Now, the best we can say is, who knows?
As Slate’s legal columnist Dahlia Lithwick has said, the conventional wisdom has turned sharply. “Today,” she writes, “it is an equally powerful article of faith that everything rests in the hands of Justice Anthony Kennedy in what will surely be a 5-4 decision.”
That could mean we were wrong a few months ago, or it could mean we’re wrong now. But it doesn’t matter. Replacing the individual mandate wouldn’t be particularly hard. All we need is another policy that does the same thing – specifically, discourage free-riders who don’t want to buy insurance until after they get sick and thus leave the rest of us paying for them.
In fact, I can give you four credible alternatives in four sentences:
We could limit enrollment changes to once every two years, so people who decide to go without insurance can’t buy coverage the moment they get a bad report from their doctor.
We could penalize those who wait to buy coverage with higher premiums, which is what we do in the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit.
We could have a five-year lockout, in which people who decide to go without coverage wouldn’t be able to access the subsidies or insurance protections for five years, even if they decided they wanted to buy insurance.
We could raise taxes by the same amount as the individual mandate penalty and give everyone who showed proof of insurance on their tax forms a “personal responsibility tax credit” of the same amount.
But all these ideas suffer the same problem: They’d need to pass through Congress. And Republicans in Congress don’t want to make the Affordable Care Act better. They want to repeal it.
This – and not the Supreme Court, or even any flaws in the design of the bill – is the real problem for the Affordable Care Act. Like any major piece of legislation, parts of it will work much better than we expect, and parts of it will disappoint us. Perhaps the experiment with paying hospitals a flat fee to treat a patient’s diabetes will prove a smashing success, leading to lower costs and higher-quality care. And perhaps the provision allowing individuals to publicly rate their insurers will prove a disaster, with companies paying the computer-savvy to rig the ratings.
In that world, the answer would be obvious: Expand the good and repeal the bad. Indeed, we should expect to do this over and over again. We’ll constantly need to double down on what works, remove what doesn’t, and add new ideas and refinements into the mix. Policymakers are never omniscient, but they are, at their best, persistent. And that’s how we’ll move from the inefficient and expensive health-care system we have to the efficient and affordable system we want: one tweak at a time.
That assumes, however, that both parties’ top priority is to get from the system we have to the system that the Affordable Care Act suggests we want: a system with lower costs and near-universal care. But is it?
Increasingly, it seems not. The Democrats have a deep and longtime commitment to health-care reform, one they’ve proven by moving continually right on the issue in a fruitless search for bipartisan support. They’ve given up on single-payer, on an employer mandate, on a public option. And they adopted the same structure that Mitt Romney signed in Massachusetts and that Republicans called for in 1994.
Republicans, meanwhile, have proven deeply and continually committed to opposing health-care reform bills pushed by Democrats. They abandoned Richard Nixon’s idea when Bill Clinton adopted it and Romney’s idea when President Obama endorsed it. In the most recent election, they ran on “repeal and replace,” but when they got to Congress, they voted on a bill that included the “repeal” but was silent on the “replace.” Even now, they’ve done nothing more than vaguely direct some committees to come up with some unspecified ideas at some unnamed date in the future.
Their inattention to “replace” is evidence that their top priority is “repeal.” But they don’t have the votes to repeal the bill. They might not have the votes to repeal it after 2012, either. But so long as they’re telling their base that they will repeal it, if not today then soon, they can’t participate in any significant reforms of the bill, as improving the legislation tacitly accepts its existence. “I think it’s clear that this is an area upon which we are not likely to reach any agreements with the president,” Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell told conservative radio host Laura Ingraham.
Democrats, meanwhile, aren’t becoming any friendlier to the GOP’s repeal efforts. Of the 13 House Democrats who voted against the law and survived the election, only three voted with the House Republicans to repeal the bill. In the Senate, not a single Democrat voted for repeal.
This raises the possibility that Congress will neither repeal the legislation nor commit itself to its success. Rather, Republicans will work to hobble it where they can, starving the law of the funds needed for its implementation, harassing the regulators charged with setting it up and stopping Democrats from improving on the law’s successes or responding to its inevitable failures. Democrats will work to ensure that the law survives, but they won’t have the votes to do much more than that.
Wounded, the law will limp along, protected from dying and prevented from thriving.
By: Ezra Klein-The Washington Post, February 8, 2011
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