How Conservative Attacks on Health Care Reform Will Affect You
Attempts to Repeal Affordable Care Act Have Serious Consequences
The Affordable Care Act provides Americans economic and health security with protections against exorbitant premium hikes, better health benefits, and slower growth in health care costs. Conservatives in the Congress are intent on taking these benefits away.
Conservatives are starting to implement their onslaught to repeal the Affordable Care Act this week as Republicans take control of the House of Representatives. They have scheduled a vote on January 12. If conservatives have their way and repeal the Affordable Care Act, we will go back to a health care system that failed millions of Americans: one with skyrocketing costs bankrupting families and our budget, fewer people with access to quality care, and more people at the mercy of the health insurance industry.
Increasing premiums for millions of Americans. Prior to passage of the Affordable Care Act, individuals and families were faced with skyrocketing premiums. Premiums for individuals increased 120 percent and family premiums increased 130 percent from 1999 to 2009. The Affordable Care Act controls these costs. In fact, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office or CBO looked at the law’s effect on premiums in 2016 and estimated that the health reform law would cut premiums for millions of Americans. These premiums cuts would be more substantial for those in the individual market, most of whom will receive subsidies to help cover the cost. According to the CBO, those receiving help in the individual market would see their premiums reduced by 56 percent to 59 percent less than they would pay without the law, while also enjoy better coverage than what they currently receive. Repealing the law means going back to a status quo of skyrocketing premiums that made health insurance out of reach and unaffordable for American families.
Costing 400,000 jobs annually. The Affordable Care Act helps create as many as 400,000 jobs annually over the next decade by lowering costs and helping promote a healthier workforce. It includes cost-containment measures to slow the rate of growth of health care spending. Small businesses in particular are helped through exchanges that allow them to pool resources to lower costs as well as tax credits to make it more affordable to offer their employees health coverage. These cost-reduction provisions free up money that otherwise would be spent on health care and allow companies to spend it hiring more workers. In addition, a healthier workforce is a more productive workforce. Those benefits disappear, as well as the jobs created along with it, if the law is repealed.
Increasing costs for seniors by as much as $1,500 in 2011. The Affordable Care Act eliminates the “donut hole” in the Medicare prescription drug program by 2020. Seniors with high prescription drug expenses before health reform had to pay full price for their prescription drugs—without any help from their drug plan—once their prescription drug spending reached a pre-defined limit. People who hit this limit in 2011 will get a 50 percent discount on their name-brand prescription drugs, saving some Medicare enrollees as much as $1,500 in out-of-pocket drug costs. Those savings will not be realized if the Affordable Care Act is repealed.
Hurting communities of color. Communities of color are more likely to be uninsured, and they suffer from higher rates of chronic illness than the rest of the population. The Affordable Care Act addresses these inequities by expanding health insurance coverage and improving access to primary care, including preventive services. These provisions will be eliminated if conservatives have their way and repeal the health reform law.
Increasing costs and deficits. The Affordable Care Act creates tools to control the growth in health costs while improving quality of care. Effective implementation can reduce administrative costs for small businesses and individuals, promote greater use of preventive care, and prevent unnecessary hospitalizations, saving as much as $2 trillion in total health spending over the next decade. In addition, the CBO estimated the law will reduce the federal budget deficit by $143 billion over the first 10 years and more than $1.2 trillion over the next two decades. Repealing the new law stymies these much-needed efforts and reverts to the unsustainable status quo of skyrocketing costs that were bankrupting our country. Make no mistake: The Affordable Care Act provides Americans economic and health security with protections against exorbitant premium hikes, better health benefits, and slower growth in health care costs. Conservatives in Congress are intent on taking these benefits away and going back to a health system that was failing America. And, to top it off, they’d keep their benefits, while taking away ours.
Americans deserve better. We need the Affordable Care Act.
By: Tony Carrk, Center For American Progress. Note: Originally Published January 5, 2011 prior to US House Vote on Repeal.
Remember The Uninsured?
In February 2007, Deamonte Driver died of an infected tooth. But he didn’t really die of an infected tooth. He died because he didn’t have consistent insurance. If he’d had an Aetna card, a dentist would’ve removed the tooth earlier, and the bacteria that filled the abscess would never have spread to his brain.
Deamonte Driver was 12. His insurance status wasn’t his fault.
If all you knew about the Affordable Care Act was what you gleaned from watching the Republicans make their case against it, you probably would not know that the legislation means health-care coverage for more than 30 million Americans. Or, if you did know that, you’d be forgiven for not realizing it’s relevant: It almost never gets mentioned (see this congressman’s rundown of the bill’s contents, for instance), and the repeal legislation the Republicans are pushing does nothing to replace the coverage the Affordable Care Act would give to those people.
The lack of concern for how more than 30 million Americans will get their health-care coverage makes for an ugly contrast with the intense concern that Rep. Andy Harris — a proponent of repeal — found when he heard that his congressional health-care coverage wouldn’t begin until a month after he took the oath of office. “He stood up and asked the two ladies who were answering questions why it had to take so long, what he would do without 28 days of health care,” recalled one of the session’s attendees. He knows his taxpayer-subsidized insurance is important. But what about Driver’s?
We have a tendency to let the conversation over health-care reform become a bloodless, abstract discussion over cost curves and CBO models. We do that for two reasons: First, cost is important. Second, it’s important to the people who have political power, which is, by and large, not the same group who doesn’t have health-care insurance. Someone involved in the 2008 campaign once told me he’d seen numbers showing that 95 percent of Obama’s voters were insured. The numbers for McCain were, presumably, similarly high, or even higher. These are the people the political system is responsive too.
But that doesn’t make the plight of the uninsured any less wrenching. The Urban Institute estimated that 22,000 people died in 2006 because they didn’t have health-care insurance. John Ayanian, a professor of medicine and health-care policy at Harvard Medical School, testified before Congress on this issue. “Uninsured adults are 25 percent more likely to die prematurely than insured adults overall,” he said, “and with serious conditions such as heart disease, diabetes or cancer, their risk of premature death can be 40 to 50 percent higher.” And none of that takes into account the unnecessary suffering and physical damage that flourishes in the absence of effective medical care. Nor does it speak to the economic devastation that illness unleashes on uninsured families.
These numbers shouldn’t surprise us: We pay a lot of money for health-care insurance. We’ve directed the government to spend even more money subsidizing that insurance for the elderly, the disabled, some of the poor and everyone who gets health-care coverage through their employer. We value this product so highly for a reason: Most of us would agree that being able to afford to see a doctor isn’t a luxury. It’s a necessity. Rep. Harris certainly feels that way.
The same goes for the uninsured. In fact, it’s often more true for them, as many haven’t received reliable care for some time and have multiple health problems that haven’t been effectively treated. That’s why, when a temporary free clinic set up shop in Los Angeles, 3,000 people lined up for treatment. It’s why the famed RAND health insurance experiment found the people who benefited from insurance most clearly were the poor, as they were often plagued by easy-to-treat conditions like hypertension.
The Affordable Care Act covers the vast majority of the uninsured. It covers everyone who makes less than the poverty line, and almost everyone who makes less than 300 percent of the poverty line. It does all this while spending about 4 percent of what our health-care system currently spends in a year, and it offsets that spending — and more — to make sure the deficit doesn’t bear the burden of society’s compassion. Perhaps there’s a better way to achieve those goals that can pass Congress. If so, I’m open to hearing about it. But to repeal the bill without another solution for the Deamonte Drivers of the world? And to do it while barely mentioning them? We’re a better country than that. Or so I like to think.
By: Ezra Klein, The Washington Post, January 19, 2011
The Impact of Health Reform on Health System Spending
The health reform legislation passed in March 2010 will introduce a range of payment and delivery system changes designed to achieve a significant slowing of health care cost growth. Most assessments of the new reform law have focused only on the federal budgetary impact. This updated analysis projects the effect of national reform on total national health expenditures and the insurance premiums that American families would likely pay. We estimate that, on net, the combination of provisions in the new law will reduce health care spending by $590 billion over 2010–2019 and lower premiums by nearly $2,000 per family. Moreover, the annual growth rate in national health expenditures could be slowed from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent.
Overview
To judge the merit of the comprehensive health reform legislation recently signed into law by President Obama, it is essential to understand its impact on the affordability of insurance coverage and overall health care spending. Most assessments of the new law consider the federal budget only. For example, the Congressional Budget Office “scored” the federal budget impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as modified by the Reconciliation Act (Affordable Care Act), finding a modest deficit reduction in the first 10 years of implementation.
But the federal budget impact is not the same as the health system impact. A portion of the federal funds would be used to reduce costs for people who already have health insurance coverage but struggle to afford it, while very small businesses would receive help in paying insurance premiums. To estimate health spending accurately, we need to separate out the costs into new health care spending and transfers of existing spending from the private sector to the government. Furthermore, CBO assigned very little savings to system reform efforts, rendering its overall analysis incomplete.
The Office of the Actuary within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, meanwhile, estimated the health system impacts of the Affordable Care Act and determined there would be a small increase in medical spending as a result of the reform. But, again, this analysis is limited, since it gives almost no weight to proposals for improving the information available to providers and modifying the financial incentives in the current system.
This study considers the new law, as enacted in March 2010, to project the impact of major health reform on national health expenditures and the insurance premiums that families will likely pay, accounting for the full range of impacts the legislation is likely to induce. As part of our analysis, we provide estimates of the effect of key provisions on health spending by government, employers, and households. We build on our earlier analysis of the draft legislation, taking account of the provisions in the final law.
Impact of reform on national health expenditures
Health care reform will affect national health expenditures through five major channels.
Impact of new coverage
Extending health insurance coverage to essentially all Americans will increase medical spending, at least in the short run. (Some argue that increased coverage will lower spending over time by making it possible to pursue more-aggressive cost-containment policies without risking access to care for the uninsured, but in this analysis we do not consider such effects.) From previous studies, data are available to estimate the magnitude of the increase in spending. Hadley and colleagues, for example, estimated that each uninsured individual who gains coverage will incur annually an additional $1,600 of medical care expenses—an increase of 70 percent. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that spending for uninsured individuals, if they become insured, will increase by 25 percent to 60 percent. The actual increase will depend in part on the rates that are paid to health care providers for treating currently uninsured patients.
For our estimates, we increase the $1,600 figure over time with expected increases in medical costs. We then multiply the revised amounts by the number of newly insured resulting from health reform to produce a total estimate. Fully phased in, incremental coverage costs about $75 billion per year to cover 60 percent of the uninsured, or 2 percent of total health care spending. This is comparable to Davis and Schoen’s projection that covering all of the uninsured would add 3 percent to medical spending, and Schoen, Davis, and Collins’s finding that covering all of the uninsured would add 2 percent to medical spending. This methodology suggests that the new law will lead to a 10-year cumulative medical spending increase of $415 billion over the period 2010–2019. This estimate is shown in the first row of Exhibit 1.
Savings in public programs
The new health reform law contains a number of changes to Medicare and Medicaid payments. Many of these are traditional payment changes—for example, reductions in the amount paid to Medicare Advantage managed care plans to a level comparable with the cost of covering beneficiaries under traditional Medicare, or smaller increases in Medicare inpatient payments to account for a likely increase in productivity and to reduce bad debts. Our estimates of the medical spending impact of these changes come from CBO. While this is a good place to begin, it should be noted that CBO has often misestimated, or failed to estimate, the behavioral consequences of such changes in the past.
We consider all such changes, with a few exceptions: 1) we exempt the net savings associated with health care modernization (Section 1104 and Title III, subtitle A, of the reform bill), which is treated separately; 2) we omit the sections associated with coverage expansions, which are accounted for above; and 3) we omit savings from the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, which are a collection of premiums in anticipation of future spending. CBO estimates that the net impact of the remaining proposals in the reform law is to reduce Medicare and Medicaid spending by $416 billion over the 2010–2019 period. This estimate is depicted in the second row of Exhibit 1.
The reduction in Medicare and Medicaid spending is approximately on par with the increase in medical costs associated with covering the uninsured. The net impact of covering the uninsured and reducing traditional program payments (and other taxes from outside the health care system) is a decrease in spending of $1 billion over 2010–2019. This roughly parallels the analysis from the Office of the Actuary, which estimated that national medical expenditures under the new law will increase by $311 billion over 2010–2019. The difference of about $30 billion per year is very small on the scale of health expenditures (less than 1 percent per year), and it indicates that our analysis matches that of the actuary when no other cost changes are considered.
Our analysis assumes that a reduction in Medicare and Medicaid payments will not be offset by higher prices to private payers and, equivalently, that fewer uninsured patients will not yield savings to existing payers because of the reduced need of payers to shift costs onto covered patients. This assumption is common to other estimators and is consistent with empirical research.
Insurance exchanges
Currently, nearly 13 percent of insurance premiums are accounted for by administrative costs. These costs range from about 5 percent in large firms and firms that are self-insured to 30 percent for individuals. Higher costs for marketing, underwriting, churning, benefit complexity, and brokers’ fees explain the bulk of the difference.
The new reform law establishes insurance exchanges that will group individuals and small firms into larger entities and thus drive down those administrative costs. The exchanges also will minimize marketing costs through more transparent posting of premiums, facilitated enrollment (assistance with the application process and screening for eligibility), and stronger oversight of industry practices.
If all individuals and small firms were to receive the same premiums as large firms or self-insured firms do, the costs of insurance administration would decline to less than 10 percent. In analyzing the experience of other countries, The Commonwealth Fund estimated that administrative costs could fall to 8 percent or lower under a robust exchange system. We assume more modest savings, such that administrative costs fall to 10 percent of total premiums—a rate also assumed to remain constant over time, even though this implies administrative costs increase along with national health spending. We assume such savings begin in 2014, the year the exchanges will become operational, and are phased in over three years. The reduction in health spending associated with reduced insurer administration is $211 billion over 2010–2019.
CBO estimates $27 billion in administrative savings owing to insurance exchanges over 10 years. CBO assumes premium reductions of between 1 percent and 4 percent for small groups in the exchanges, and no savings for large groups, for an average of about 0.4 percent. We assume additional savings above this amount, totaling $184 billion over 2010–2019 (see third line of Exhibit 1).
Health system modernization
The reform law includes numerous provisions intended to improve the information available to patients and providers and the incentives facing medical care providers, and thus make medical care more efficient. The Commonwealth Fund has summarized these provisions. Within the Medicare and Medicaid programs, these include:
- Payment innovations, including higher reimbursement for preventive care services and patient-centered primary care, bundled payment for hospital, physician, and other services provided for a single episode of care, shared savings or capitation payments for accountable provider groups that assume responsibility for the continuum of a patient’s care, and pay-for-performance incentives for Medicare providers
- An Independent Payment Advisory Board, with the authority to make recommendations that reduce cost growth and improve quality in both the Medicare program and the health system as a whole
- A new Innovation Center within the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, charged with streamlining the testing of demonstration and pilot projects in Medicare and rapidly expanding successful models across the program
- Profiling medical care providers on the basis of cost and quality, making that data available to consumers and insurance plans, and providing relatively low-quality, high-cost providers with financial incentives to improve their care
- Increased funding for comparative effectiveness research
- Increased emphasis on wellness and prevention.
The exact amount that will be saved from these provisions collectively is uncertain. Partly as a result of this uncertainty, CBO and the Office of the Actuary assume only minor savings. For example, CBO estimated that the major parts of the law including these provisions will cost $10 billion over the 2010–2019 period, while the Office of the Actuary determined savings of only $2 billion.
Other estimates, however, suggest that an aggressive approach to health care modernization could result in significantly greater cost reductions. Beeuwkes-Buntin and Cutler estimated a 1.5-percentage-point reduction in cost increases annually from significant health care reform, or more than $700 billion in the 10-year window. These savings would come from two primary sources. First, administrative expenses incurred by provider groups would decline as electronic medical records, and incentives to use them appropriately, are widely disseminated. The potential for administrative savings has been stressed by both provider groups and insurers, and they are distinct from the reduction in insurance administration noted above. Second, reform would lead to fewer and less-costly acute care episodes. Potentially substantial savings could be had by preventing certain illnesses from recurring through better coordination of care and by rationalizing what is done when a person becomes sick by bundling payments, paying more for quality care, and sharing savings with accountable provider organizations.
Similarly, Hussey, Eibner, Ridgely et al. estimate that savings of more than 10 percent are possible, largely from payment reforms like bundled-payment systems. Realizing these savings over a decade implies cost reductions of nearly 1.5 percentage points annually. A more conservative mid-range set of assumptions suggests that such reforms could reduce growth in national health expenditures by about one percentage point per year.
The combination of provisions in the new law will achieve substantial savings in total health spending. A Commonwealth Fund report indicates that similar provisions will slow annual growth in national health expenditures from 6.5 percent to 5.6 percent over the period 2010–2020. Thus, cost reductions on the order of 1.0 percentage points are realistic. We assume such savings are first realized in 2014, to allow time for payment changes to be designed and implemented and exchanges to become operational.
The public and private savings from health system modernization are $406 billion over the 10 years (see fourth line of Exhibit 1). These savings are smaller in the early years but increase over time.
Taking account of these different factors, on net the new law will reduce health care spending by $590 billion over 2010–2019. Exhibit 2 shows the changes by year, highlighting significant savings potential as payment and system reforms are fully phased in.
We find that the annual rate of growth in national health expenditures falls from 6.1 percent before reform to 5.7 percent after reform. When the current projection is corrected to reflect underutilization of services by the uninsured, the reform package lowers the annual rate of growth from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent, a reduction of 0.6 percentage points per year (Exhibit 3).
The savings we estimate are comparable to the reports by CBO and the Office of the Actuary, with the exception that we also include reasonable impacts of system modernization incentives and efforts to streamline sales of insurance.
Impact on the federal budget
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the reform law will reduce the federal deficit by $143 billion over the 10 years, 2010–2019. Our estimates of the federal deficit impact differ from CBO’s in two ways. First, we include savings to Medicare and Medicaid resulting from health system modernization. In addition, reductions in employer spending for health insurance lead to increases in wage and salary payments, which are taxed by the federal government. While CBO accounted for some of this effect in recent estimates, further reductions in employer spending for health insurance can be expected from modernization and lower administrative costs. We assume that 90 percent of private health insurance savings are passed on to employees through increased wages, which are taxed at an average marginal rate of 28 percent.
The net effect is a federal deficit reduction of $400 billion over 2010–2019 (Exhibit 4). This reduction results from several factors. As estimated by CBO, the federal cost of insurance coverage expansion is $788 billion. Savings from payment and system reform provisions are projected to generate $682 billion—more than is estimated by CBO, owing to the reasonable estimates of health system modernization provisions. Our federal tax revenue projection mirrors that of CBO’s, though we also add in the additional revenue from employer savings and increased wages from modernization and lower administrative costs—projected to raise $86 billion over the 10-year, 2010–2019 period.
Impact on Medicare
Prior to reform, Medicare expenditures were projected to grow by 6.8 percent annually from 2010 to 2019 (Exhibit 5). The payment and system reform savings estimated by CBO total $397 billion when CLASS and non-Medicare provisions are removed. Applying these net Medicare savings bends the Medicare spending curve and reduces the projected annual growth rate to 5.5 percent. When additional savings from health system modernization are accounted for, the annual growth rate is reduced to 4.9 percent and total 10-year savings reach $524 billion.
Impact on premiums for private coverage
Reducing insurer administration and modernizing the delivery of health care services will each result in reductions in private insurance premiums. Private premiums might be affected by other provisions as well. For example, an excise tax on high-premium health insurance plans, set to take effect in 2018, will introduce a strong financial incentive for insurers to trim benefits and reduce costs below a tax-free threshold of $10,200 for individual coverage and $27,500 for family coverage. Indexing this cap to the overall rate of inflation in the economy plus one percentage point will encourage insurers to seek out value and efficiency continually, thus placing downward pressure on premiums over time.
Health reform might also alter the generosity of the average insurance benefits offered, which may raise premiums for certain groups. In the current market, many people have coverage that is extremely limited, with deductibles totaling many thousands of dollars and entire classes of services that are excluded. Such people will face premium increases under reform, although the quality of the coverage will be significantly improved and out-of-pocket expenses reduced.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that such changes will increase nongroup premiums. For purposes of this analysis, we exclude changes in premiums associated with better coverage, since one would need to consider the impacts of the enhanced coverage and correspondingly lower out-of-pocket spending to be able to gauge the impact of the changes accurately.
In addition, health reform might change the risk pool and thus affect the average cost of enrollees. Limiting age-based underwriting without providing offsetting subsidies to young adults would drive many within this population out of the insurance market. Close-to-universal coverage, in contrast, might bring more young people into the market, thus lowering premiums. Because of the issues associated with changes in out-of-pocket spending when people move in and out of coverage, this effect is, again, omitted.
We estimate the impact of insurance exchanges and system reform on average premiums using a method analogous to the one proposed above. In particular, we consider how reductions in administrative loads and more-efficient care delivery will affect average market premiums. The basis for the premium estimates is the average employer premium in 2006, as determined by the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. This premium is then trended forward using the projected growth of premiums under the different scenarios.
Exhibit 6 shows the premium estimates. Without reform, premiums are expected to increase from $13,305 in 2010 to $21,458 in 2019. Relative to this increase, premiums under reform increase only three-quarters as much. By 2019, family premiums are nearly $2,000 lower. Adding reductions in out-of-pocket costs and lower taxes for Medicare and Medicaid will result in estimated savings for the typical family of over $2,500 that year. Again, these are conservative estimates: a recent analysis by the Business Roundtable prepared by Hewitt, for example, found that such legislative reforms could potentially reduce the trend line in employment-based health care spending by about $3,000 per employee by 2019.22
Explaining the difference with other estimates
The estimated health system savings we present are larger than those forecast by the Congressional Budget Office and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Office of the Actuary, which are similar to each other. The common assessments of CBO and the CMS actuary are not surprising, since most of the evidence upon which they are based comprises peer-reviewed studies that utilize carefully controlled comparison groups (either randomized trials or the natural equivalent). Within that genre, the dominant published themes are the inexorable nature of technology-led medical care cost increases, and the resulting need for unalterable demand- or supply-side constraints to confront that trend.
Although there is significant evidence in the literature that medical care providers are responsive to financial incentives, there is not much evidence in the published literature on policy reforms short of severe constraints that save large amounts of money. And for every study that shows savings from baseline, there is another study that does not. Thus, the common assessment is that there is little efficacious that can be done.
There is, however, a less formal, but no less important, literature that sees the world very differently. Business scholars, including Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg, and Clay Christenson, Jerome Grossman, and Jason Hwang, all note the enormous inefficiency in health care relative to other industries: excessive administrative spending, wasted time and money, and resources spent not reducing costs but simply passing them along to others. These scholars highlight the enormous potential for productivity improvement that reform can drive if it makes health care operate more like other industries.
Through their experiences, health care practitioners reach a similar conclusion. Physicians on the frontlines of medicine, including Guy Clifton, Arthur Garson, Atul Gawande, and Arnold Relman, see the waste that exists and hold a common view on why it exists—principally, misaligned incentives. They show how health care would be better and cheaper were it not for a health care system that discourages such improvements. Echoing the story of misaligned incentives are journalistic accounts showing how the health system fails patients, physicians, and society as a payer. Each case cries out for reforms that would change the underlying perverse incentives.
A number of case studies lend support for the potential of reform. The experiences of Geisinger Health System, HealthPartners, Denver Health, and other health care delivery organizations demonstrate that health can be improved and costs lowered. They also point to the components that are most critical for system improvement. While these studies are often published in the professional literature, their authors do not employ the careful comparison groups that would make the results compelling to the most skeptical reviewers. Thus, case study findings are not given as much emphasis as they otherwise might.
While views differ as to appropriate evidence standards, the situation we analyze is one where there are essentially no clinical trials and where effects of multiple large policy changes may differ substantially from the effects of small trials of single interventions. In such a situation, it is imperative to cast a wider net than traditional evidence standards do. Our decision to be more inclusive in the use of evidence is the primary reason why our results diverge from those of CBO and the CMS Office of the Actuary.
Conclusion
The new health reform law introduces a range of payment and delivery system changes likely to result in a significant slowing of health care cost growth. First, the law calls for the creation of health insurance exchanges that offer a choice of plans and the ability, for the first time, to truly compare plan premiums. The exchanges will have authority to reject plans with excessive premium increases and to set caps on insurance profits and overhead of no more than 15 percent of premiums for large firms and 20 percent of the premiums for small firms and individuals, producing savings to employers and workers that might reach 15 percent to 20 percent by 2019.
The law also begins to change how providers are paid and care is delivered, so that they are rewarded not for the volume of services they provide but for the value they offer. It accelerates the testing, adoption, and spread of innovative payment methods to control growth in volume of services. The law also includes extensive provisions to report data on quality and cost and to enhance choice. Finally, the law directs investments in primary and preventive care, among other changes, that have the potential to yield substantial savings.
In addition to significant payment and delivery system reform, the Affordable Care Act will extend coverage to an estimated 32 million previously uninsured Americans by 2019. Improving access to care should return substantial improvement in overall population health, increase workforce productivity, and reduce the significant financial risk uninsured and underinsured individuals and families now face in the unreformed market.
Even with these improvements in coverage, we estimate that the combination of provisions in the new law will save $590 billion or more in national health spending over 2010–2019 and lower premiums by nearly $2,000 per family. The annual growth rate in national health expenditures will be slowed from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent.
Congress and the President have enacted a historic health care reform law that will help ensure that all families are able to get the care they need, as well as financial security and relief from rising premiums. The legislation is a significant first step toward bending the health care cost curve for the federal government and families, and it will yield real economic benefits.
By David M. Cutler, Karen Davis, Kristof Stremikis | May 21, 2010-Center for American Progress
In Search of Plan “C” for Health Care Reform?….Stick With Plan “A”
The Washington Post has an editorial this morning that doesn’t exactly oppose the President’s health reform proposals, but gives the President a rap on the knuckles for not being more aggressive controlling costs. They are particularly aggrieved that the President proposes to delay the implementation of the “Cadillac tax” on high-cost health plans to 2018.
“Count us among the worriers. The tax is key for two reasons. It would raise revenue needed to pay subsidies to the currently uninsured; Mr. Obama chose the politically easier option of extending the Medicare tax to unearned income of the wealthy, thus making it more difficult down the road to prevent Medicare from going bankrupt. And, by discouraging expensive plans, such a tax would be the single most effective tool to reduce the cost growth that threatens the nation’s well-being”.
This editorial is one of the more exasperating documents to appear during health reform.
I happen to favor the “Cadillac tax,” though I wish it were more explicitly limited to affluent taxpayers. This is a sensitive issue. Workers have made wage concessions to expand or to preserve generous health benefits that might be affected by the new policy. I see nothing inherently wrong with giving unions and firms more time to adjust collective bargaining agreements in light of new tax policies.
Especially perverse is the Post’s criticism of proposals to raise Medicare taxes on the wealthy. Viewed outside the context of health reform, this provision provides one needed corrective to the regressive tax cuts enacted during the Bush years. The idea that it is simple political expediency to raise taxes on capital income of the wealthy comes as a great surprise to anyone who has followed American tax policy over (say) the past 30 years. Three other issues are especially irksome in the Post’s editorial.
First, President Obama proposes many features designed to reduce the level and growth of medical spending. He has gotten little political credit for these complex and controversial measures, but they are there.
Insurance exchanges will reduce administrative and marketing costs in the markets for individual and small-group coverage. This idea enjoys wide Democratic and Republican support. The President would reduce significant overpayments to Medicare advantage plans. He supports bundled payment models and other innovations designed to improve quality and cost-effectiveness of care. He supports greater use of comparative effectiveness research to provide an evidence-base for improved resource allocation decisions.
Over considerable opposition from within his own party, the President supports an Independent Medicare Advisory Board modeled after the commission that recommends military base closings. The Congressional Budget Office gave the President little credit for this in the scoring numbers. Yet this change could have a potentially revolutionary impact on Medicare policy–which is exactly why so many pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, many medical specialties, and many elected politicians are unhappy with this measure.
Some of these measures are buried in the fine print. Others were included despite deep opposition from self-avowed fiscal conservatives whose concern for the federal budget precisely stops at the boundaries of their own states or their own favored constituencies. (The most powerful cost-control measure, a strong public option, was brought down by Republicans, insurers, and virtually the entire supply-side of the medical economy, but that is another story.)
These obvious realities underscore the second reason why the Post’s argument is so irksome. Although the House and Senate bills include many specific elements favored by (for example) officials in the last Bush administration, Republicans have made a basic strategic decision to filibuster and to vote in lockstep against the signature policy initiative of the Obama Presidency.
As a result, President Obama needed to corral every single Democratic vote to pass the signature measure of his presidency. The President was willing to deal on tort reform and other difficult matters. Although the gang of six talked interminably, no Republicans were willing to deal.
Proposed piecemeal, the cost-control measures already contained in the President’s proposal would command little public or interest-group support. These measures would command little enthusiasm from a Congress freed from the fiscal constraints required to pass a comprehensive bill that simultaneously provides critical benefits to millions of people.
The Post seems oblivious to the fact that defeat of the President’s comprehensive reform would damage any future cost-control effort. Interest groups that oppose specific measures–certainly including the “Cadillac tax” –would cite this defeat in discouraging politicians from supporting similar efforts. They would cite the success of crudely demagogic “death panel” rhetoric to deter serious measures to improve the quality and economy of Medicare services.
Progressive politicians desperate to help millions of uninsured people would learn from this episode that the smart move is to propose a politically attractive package of benefits without offsetting spending reductions or taxes to pay for it. I would hardly blame them.
Then there is the third reason. The Post writes: “We think that it is not asking too much, given the dire fiscal straits, for Washington to show that it can swallow distasteful medicine while, and not after, it passes out the candy.”
No candy is being distributed here. The bill whose survival is at stake is not some pork-barrel agriculture or weapons bill. After decades of failure, this bill would provide critical protection for 50 million uninsured people. It would help millions of others facing medical bankruptcy because they are underinsured or because they have serious illnesses leading them to exceed lifetime insurance caps that would be immediately ended under the President’s proposal.
This very morning, our local Catholic church presented an appeal from a family whose infant son was diagnosed with Hemophagocytic Lymphohistiocytosis, a rare and deadly disease. As the costs of his care approach $1 million, the family has established a website appealing for help. They have no plan B. There is no plan B for states, either, which desperately need this bill to avoid even more dire fiscal difficulties than are projected for the federal government.
The President has spent the past year, and has risked much of his presidency, to address these critical needs. After this bill is passed, he and the Congress should pursue further serious cost-containment efforts. The current bill provides the best platform to do this.
There is a moral urgency to passing this bill. The President, House and Senate leaders might have done more to cut costs if they had even secured one or two moderate Republican votes. They had to cut some messy deals to get this done. There were good reasons to do so. Against heavy odds and several decades of failed efforts, President Obama and his allies are close to getting this done. By fetishing a single imperfect aspect of the President’s proposal, the Post mischaracterizes the policy dilemma. The Post also misses the magnitude of what is at stake.
By: Harold Pollack- the Helen Ross Professor of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago and a Special Correspondent for The Treatment-The New Republic, March 7, 2010
Summited Out: The GOP Wants Capitulation, Not Compromise
Who won? It’s the exact same question people asked in 2008, after each of the presidential debates. I didn’t like it then and I don’t like it now. What’s “winning”–scoring more debate points, making fewer gaffes, or simply appealing to more voters? And aren’t all those judgments pretty subjective anyway?
But if Thursday’s event didn’t produce a winner, it was clarifying.
Health care reform, as I’ve said many times now, is really about achieving three basic goals: Making sure everybody has insurance, making sure coverage is good, and making sure that, over time, medical care will cost less. Thursday’s discussion revealed the stark differences between the two parties–not just over how to pursue these goals but also over whether they are even worth pursuing.
Making sure everybody has insurance is primarily a matter of providing access to policies, regardless of medical status, and then guaranteeing that people can pay for them, no matter what their income. The former requires re-engineering the insurance market–in particular, organizing the non-group market into insurance exchanges, through which insurers will sell regular policies at regular prices even to people with pre-existing conditions. The latter requires providing subsidies, based on people’s incomes, which in turn requires raising some money.
The Republicans made clear on Thursday they rejected both ideas. Re-engineering the insurance market requires too much government, they said, and providing subsidies requires too much money. The best they could offer were “high-risk pools,” which would provide thinner coverage–at higher prices–to people who couldn’t get insurance on their own. This means expanding coverage to only 3 million people, rather than 30 million, but the Republicans hardly seem to care. When Obama asked Wyoming Senator John Barrasso to speak to the problems of the uninsured, Barrasso responded by saying he wanted to talk about … the already insured. Not that Democrats mind talking about the already insured.
Reform’s second goal–making sure everybody’s coverage is good–is primarily for the benefit of people who have insurance today. Many of these people have coverage that won’t meet their needs, although they may not know it yet. Only when they get sick will they discover that their plans have loopholes, allow for exorbitant out-of-pocket costs, and leave them with little recourse if there are disputes over what’s covered. The Democrats propose to fix this by establishing a minimum set of benefits that all plans must cover, limiting the amount of out-of-pocket expenses insurers can pass along, and creating appeals mechanisms for consumers upset about denials.
This approach, too, is one the Republicans rejected on Thursday. Over and over again, Republican representatives and senators said the problem wasn’t insufficient regulation. It was too much regulation. They called for allowing people to purchase insurance across state lines–and allowing small businesses to form associations that would be exempt from existing state regulations. The effect of such changes, as the Congressional Budget Office has noted, would be to erode benefits–to weaken, not strengthen, the protection from medical expenses insurance now provides. Senator Tom Coburn praised this transformation, suggesting the great exposure would turn people into smarter consumers. Well, it might do that. Or it might simply mean people with medical problems face even more onerous financial burdens.
And what about making medical care less expensive? The Democrats’ approach is to try a combination of approaches: Eliminating waste, redirecting Medicare payments so that they reward efficiency, altering the tax treatment of insurance, and so on. They admit it will take time and that they are not sure which approaches will work best. But these efforts get at the root causes of rising medical costs–not just profit or administrative inefficiency, but also the tendency towards unnecessary over-treatment.
Republicans in theory should support many of these ideas, but, as usual, they had nothing good to say about them. Instead, they continued to pound the Democrats for cutting Medicare, even though the Democratic reductions are calibrated to make the program more responsive–and even though the Democratic reductions are far smaller than the ones Republicans have championed over the last 15 years (not to mention the ones Representative Paul Ryan still supports).
Instead, the Republicans’ great hope for reducing cost lay in de-regulation–which, again, succeeds only by shifting medical expenses back onto the people with medical problems–and malpractice reform–another idea that Democrats support but that, according to CBO, doesn’t actually account for that much spending.
The Republicans have their justifications–and, to be fair, if they are convinced government spending and regulation will do more harm than good, then they are right to hold these many views. But it is not as if their alternatives even come close to solving the problems Democrats would. Instead, Republicans seem to believe these problems are fundamentally unsolvable, at least in any manner they would find acceptable.
And this explains the message Republicans delivered over and over again on Thursday: Rip up the bill and start over. That’s not a plea for compromise. That’s a demand for capituation. And it frames the choice for Democrats pretty clearly. Either they will act alone, or they will not act at all.
By: Jonathan Cohn, Senior Editor- The New Republic Feb. 26, 2010
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