Be Careful What You Wish For: Repeal of the Affordable Care Act Would Be Harmful to Society and Costly for Our Country
The new Republican leadership of the House of Representatives says repeal of the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is their top priority. The Republicans pushing for repeal, however, conveniently ignore the enormous step backward that repeal would represent for health care in our country, for the income security of our citizens, and for the fiscal health of our government.
The Affordable Care Act is not just a law designed to cover the majority of our nation’s uninsured, moving us into the league of industrialized nations which guarantee universal health coverage for its citizens. The law also takes the crucial first steps toward reining in our runaway health care costs. It ends discriminatory insurance practices that leave many of our citizens one bad gene, or badly timed accident, away from personal bankruptcy. It does so while introducing insurance market competition that will lead to lower health insurance premiums for some, and better coverage for others, in the so-called nongroup insurance market where workers without employer-provided health insurance turn for coverage. The Affordable Care Act does all this while significantly reducing our enormous federal budget deficit over the next 10 years.
Opponents of the new health reform law claim we can have many of the beneficial features documented above while repealing the parts they don’t like. This is a misleading and dangerous assertion. In fact, virtually none of the accomplishments of the new law are possible without the entire law’s infrastructure coming into place. That’s why all of the harms of repeal documented in this issue brief below will take place if the new law were to be scuttled.
To understand the consequences of repealing the Affordable Care Act, we can turn to two sources of objective information. The first is the careful and comprehensive effort put in by the Congressional Budget Office to evaluate the law’s impacts, including their recent report summarizing the effects of repealing the new law. The second is the closest case study we have where major elements of the new federal law are already in place—the state of Massachusetts, which passed a similar reform in early 2006. So let’s now turn to the different harms repeal of the health reform would deliver up to the American people.
Repeal means more uninsured, and worse public health
The first noticeable feature of a world without the new health reform law would be the much higher share of Americans without health insurance coverage. Absent the Affordable Care Act, CBO projects that 54 million people in our country, or almost 20 percent of our nonelderly population, will be uninsured by 2019. The new law will cover 32 million of those uninsured, according to CBO, or about 60 percent, with much of the remainder undocumented immigrants who are ineligible for coverage. This is more than a projection: It is also the same percentage share of the uninsured in Massachusetts who have been covered by that state’s health reform effort.
Clearly, repeal of the new law would have enormous negative consequences for our nation’s public health. Numerous studies document the dire health implications of uninsurance. An earlier study by the Institute of Medicine estimated that, in the year 2000 (when 38 million persons were uninsured), there were 18,000 deaths per year due to uninsurance. This suggests that repealing the Affordable Care Act could lead to 15,000 more deaths per year due to higher lack of insurance.
Repeal means increased financial risk for U.S. households alongside distorted labor markets
The impact of repeal extends well beyond those households who are uninsured. Indeed, repealing the new law would reach any household who faces the risk of losing their employer-sponsored health insurance. This is because the Affordable Care Act will fix the fundamental broken system of nongroup insurance in the United States.
Currently, individuals who do not have access to employer-provided group insurance coverage face a nongroup insurance market that is discriminatory and expensive. In most states individuals can be denied insurance coverage because they are ill or have their pre-existing illnesses excluded from coverage. Individuals who become ill can face personal bankruptcy as a result. Even when nongroup insurance is available, in most states insurance is priced according to individual health, with the oldest and sickest enrollees paying many multiples of younger and healthier enrollees.
There is a fundamental unfairness to a system under which individuals can face financial ruin because they have the wrong genes, or cross the street at the wrong time, but don’t happen to have access to insurance through their employer. Moreover, such a system significantly distorts our labor markets by forcing individuals to stay in jobs that offer health insurance rather than to move to newer and more productive positions where coverage is not available. Millions of U.S. workers are not moving to better jobs for them or starting new businesses because there is nowhere to turn for insurance coverage should they leave their jobs.
The Affordable Care Act would fix this flaw in our system. Insurance companies would no longer be allowed to price discriminate or deny coverage based on health or pre-existing conditions, and price differentials by age would be lowered. Individuals would be free to move to the job of their choice or to become entrepreneurs without fear of facing uninsurance.
Repealing the new health reform law would leave us in a world of broken nongroup insurance markets, with the attendant financial risk for individuals and the continued distortion to our labor markets. Why? Because without the comprehensive framework of the new law, it is incredibly costly to make insurance fairer in nongroup markets.
If insurance companies must charge the same price to people whether they’re sick or healthy, for example, then many healthy people will view this as a “bad deal” and not buy insurance. This results in higher prices because only the sick would buy insurance, chasing even more people out of the market. The result is a “death spiral” that leads only the sick to purchase insurance at very high prices. Several states tried such community rating reforms in their non-group markets over the past two decades, and the results were sharp rises in insurance prices and rapidly shrinking market size. The only way to make insurance market reform feasible is to pair it with large subsidies to purchase insurance and an individual requirement for coverage, as is the case with the Affordable Care Act.
Direct evidence for this point comes from Massachusetts. In the late 1990s the state moved to a nondiscriminatory nongroup market, but without the subsidies and the individual requirement that are central to the Affordable Care Act. The result was a collapse of the state’s nongroup market, so that by 2006 the state had by far the highest nongroup premiums in the nation. In 2006, the state implemented their comprehensive reform, which added to the insurance market reforms extensive low-income subsidies to purchase insurance and an individual requirement for coverage. This resulted in a 40 percent reduction in nongroup premiums in Massachusetts over a period where such premiums were rising by 14 percent nationally. That’s just one reason why the new law is called the Affordable Care Act.
Repeal means a noncompetitive and expensive nongroup insurance market
Another reason the Affordable Care Act works to bring down costs is because without it, a typical health insurance policy is much more expensive in the nongroup market than in the group market, partly because nongroup insurance markets are less competitive than group insurance markets in many states. There is no common marketplace where individuals can compare the prices of all the options that are available to them in the nongroup market. As a result, existing market participants keep prices high and new firms are unable to promote lower costs as a tool of market entry.
The Affordable Care Act addresses this problem in two important ways. The first is by introducing competitive insurance exchanges in every state. Individuals would be able to shop more effectively, comparing their nongroup options in a competitive and transparent environment. This approach has already had a notable success in Massachusetts, where the introduction of the state’s Connector health insurance exchange expanded the use of nongroup insurance and promoted the entry of a major new low-cost insurer into the state’s nongroup insurance market.
Without the Affordable Care Act states are unlikely to be able to establish transformative and competitive exchanges for the purchase of nongroup insurance. Many states have tried over the past 20 years to establish insurance exchanges and they have virtually all either failed or had little impact. This is typically because insurers were afraid that individuals would choose to buy from the exchanges only if they were sick, which meant prices in the exchange were high and demand for exchange products was low. With low demand, exchanges could not establish the economies of scale necessary for success.
The success of exchanges under the new health reform law will be due to the fact that individuals will be both required to purchase insurance and that insurance purchase will be subsidized only through the exchange. This will promote exchanges on a scale necessary to succeed in promoting competition in state insurance markets.
The second way that the Affordable Care Act addresses the high costs of nongroup insurance is through the introduction of new tax credits to make health insurance affordable through the exchange. The typical middle-class family in the United States would now be provided financial support to ensure that they would not have to spend an unfair amount for the insurance they need to protect their family.
The upshot: Repealing the new law would mean returning to an era where individuals can’t effectively compare their insurance options, guaranteeing continued noncompetitive and expensive insurance in this market. And it would mean that individuals would face the full prices in these noncompetitive markets without the necessary tax credits to make insurance affordable. Repeal, in short, would be unfair, ineffective, inefficient, and costly.
Repeal means free riders would continue to exploit the health care system
Another fundamental flaw in our current health care system before passage of the Affordable Care Act was that individuals could “free ride,” remaining uninsured until they need care and then turning to emergency rooms. Emergency rooms are required by law to provide care to all regardless of insurance coverage. The associated uncompensated care costs of treating these individuals amount to a more than $40 billion a year tax on the insured in the United States
The Affordable Care Act ends this free riding by requiring that individuals purchase insurance if it is affordable for them (which it will be for most due to the subsidies described earlier). This personal responsibility requirement, originally the brainchild of Republican experts, would end the unfairness of a system where emergency room health care providers are required to treat everyone but individuals are not in turn required to pay their fair share of the costs of treatment. Repealing the new law would mean returning to a world where individuals can simply wait until they are sick to get treated, passing the costs on to the rest of society that is paying their share.
Repeal means the continued decline of private insurance
There was an enormous erosion of private insurance coverage in the United States over the past decade. Employer-sponsored insurance fell by 15 percent and nongroup insurance has not grown to keep pace. The result today is an increase in both the ranks of the uninsured and the publicly insured.
The Affordable Care Act arrests this decline and promotes private insurance coverage. According to the CBO, the new law will lead to a small erosion in employersponsored insurance coverage, offset by a rise in nongroup insurance coverage that is almost five times as large. Overall, private insurance coverage in the United States will rise by 15 million people due to the Affordable Care Act.
Repeal would provide no cushion for our citizens to offset this rapid decline in employer-sponsored insurance coverage. Fifteen million fewer U.S. residents would have private insurance than without the law. The Affordable Care Act is not a government takeover of the U.S. health system; it is a means of using reformed private nongroup insurance markets to more effectively fight the steady decline in employer-provided group insurance. Repeal means a fundamental retreat from the promise of private health insurance coverage for our citizens.
Repeal means higher and more rapidly growing budget deficits
The Affordable Care Act delivers a unique dose of fiscal responsibility in an era of rapidly growing federal budget deficits. The new law offsets its new spending with even larger reductions in other spending and revenue increases. As a result, CBO estimates that the legislation will reduce the deficit by more than $100 billion by 2019, and by more than $1 trillion in the decade after that.
What is not widely appreciated is that deficit reduction due to the new health law will rise over time. The cuts in excessive spending and increases in revenues are back-loaded, not front-loaded as with so many other recent pieces of legislation. This is illustrated by the fact that the most recent CBO estimate shows that repeal would raise the deficit by $230 billion over the next decade. And, because the net budget savings from the new health law will grow over time, repeal would raise the deficit by much larger and ever growing amounts into the future.
Repeal would therefore mean undoing the enormous fiscal benefits of this legislation. Offsetting a more than $100 billion hole in the budget deficit by 2019 would require significant cuts elsewhere in the budget or other increases in revenues. And it seems highly unlikely that Congress would enact spending or revenue changes that would increase so rapidly over time. That means even fixes that offset the short-term costs of repealing the new law would not address the enormous long-term hole it would leave in our budget.
Repeal means a critical step backward on cost control
Reforming insurance markets and covering the uninsured are actually the relatively easy lifts for the new health reform law when compared to the more daunting and fundamental challenge—reducing the rate of growth in health care costs, which threatens to bankrupt our government and our nation. U.S. spending on health care is very high and a source of great concern but it is the growth rate of medical spending, not its level, that ultimately determines our country’s financial well-being. Absent the Affordable Care Act, if current trends persist we will be spending an unsustainable 38 percent of our GDP on health care by 2075 because the growth of health care costs would continue to outstrip the growth rate of the overall economy.
Addressing the rapidly rising costs of medical care, however, faces two daunting barriers. The first is scientific: There is tremendous uncertainty about how to lower health care costs without sacrificing health care quality. There is a broad consensus that there is significant waste in our health care system. But there is little consensus about the best way to address that waste without risking the enormous gains in population health due to health care improvements in recent decades. The second barrier is political: There are major entrenched interests that are threatened by fundamental health care reform and who will strongly oppose any such efforts.
In the face of these barriers, our political process has found it difficult to make progress on significant cost-control efforts over the past several decades. The Affordable Care Act represents the most important step forward in cost control in at least 30 years. The new law pursues many different approaches toward cost control, studying them to see which ones work best. This is through provisions that:
- Reduce consumer demand for excessive medical care through the “Cadillac tax” on high-cost insurance plans.
- Reduce health care provider payments by appointing a depoliticized board to make up-or-down recommendations to Congress on changes to Medicare’s provider payments.
- Set up dozens of health care pilot programs to test various approaches to revamping provider-payment incentives and organizational structure.
- Invest hundreds of millions of dollars in new comparative-effectiveness research.
- Launch pilot programs to assess the impact of various reorganizations of the medical malpractice process.
None of these approaches is guaranteed to work but together they represent a significant step toward fundamental cost control.
Importantly, they represent steps that are unlikely to happen if the Affordable Care Act is repealed. None of these ideas are new; most have been around for decades. But it was through the overall push for health reform that Congress was able to finally put them in place. Absent such a unifying framework, the barriers which have blocked cost-control efforts in the past will continue to stand in the way of moving forward on cost-control efforts.
Bottom line: Repeal is a dramatic step backward
The debate over repeal of the Affordable Care Act is characterized by enormous misinformation and confusion. Opponents of the legislation exploit this for political gains. A legitimate debate over the Affordable Care Act and the future of health care in America must recognize the fundamental improvements to our health care system put in place by this new law. Repealing would lead to:
- A society with poorer health and ultimately more deaths from lack of medical care
- A continued unfair and expensive nongroup insurance market that leads to economic instability, medical bankruptcy, and a less efficient job market where individuals are afraid to move to more productive job opportunities
- Continued free riding by those who pass billions of dollars in care costs onto the insured
- A massive decline in private insurance coverage
- Huge and unsustainable increases in budget deficits reaching trillions of dollars over coming decades
- A fundamental step backward in our efforts to control the health care costs which threaten to bankrupt our society
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is aptly named. Repeal would mean less health care protection for more and more Americans at higher and higher costs to themselves, their families, and our nation. We simply cannot afford to repeal the new law.
By: Jonathan Gruber, Professor of Health Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Massachusetts Health Connector Authority: January 19, 2011
Why We Need the Minimum Coverage Mandate
A district court judge in Virginia ruled on December 13 that the “minimum coverage” requirement in the Affordable Care Act is unconstitutional. The opinion is clearly at odds with other rulings in Virginia and in Michigan, where courts upheld the law.
Judges may disagree, but there’s a consensus among legal and economic scholars that this requirement to purchase health insurance is essential to making health insurance available and affordable to everyone, without regard to health status or “pre-existing conditions.” Without this provision, the law is unworkable and the consumer protections it provides become unenforceable. As the issue wends its way through the courts, it is useful to review why this requirement is in the law and the valuable protections we have to lose if it’s eviscerated.
Today, limited affordable coverage in the small business and individual markets reflects the fact that purchasing health insurance is totally voluntary. Given that health insurance is expensive relative to family or small business incomes, people are reluctant to purchase protection unless and until they need health care. If people who need health care come to dominate an insurer’s policyholders, then insurance can no longer spread or “pool” risk—collect premium dollars from a broadly healthy group of purchasers to distribute to the minority among them who need costly care. For this reason, health insurers do everything they can to screen out or deny protection to people with care needs. The Affordable Care Act ended those practices.
Opponents of the Affordable Care Act claim we can change this behavior without a requirement that people buy health insurance, and simply prohibit insurers from denying health insurance based on pre-existing conditions. But states have tried and failed in this approach. Several states tried what are called “community rating reforms”—requiring health insurers to offer policies within a given area at the same price to all persons without medical underwriting. The result: dramatic increases in insurance prices and a rapidly shrinking insurance market. In other words, the markets failed.
The lesson—incorporated in the Affordable Care Act—is that effective insurance markets require not only requirements on insurers, but requirements that people buy insurance along with subsidies to make insurance affordable. All three legs of this three-legged stool are critical to effective health insurance.
What happens if requirement to purchase coverage is removed as Judge Henry Hudson ruled? One of us has estimated the effects using a microsimulation model similar to that used by the Congressional Budget Office to estimate the Affordable Care Act’s effects. The results are striking. Eliminating the minimum coverage provision would increase the average individual premium by 27 percent in 2019 and reduce the expansion of insurance coverage by three-quarters, from 60 percent to 12 percent of the 55 million people uninsured in 2019.
Removing the mandate would at the same time dramatically alter the “bang for the buck” in federal spending. While removing the mandate cuts the legislation’s coverage gains by more than 75 percent, it would reduce the spending by less than a quarter—as subsidies are increased to cover the higher premiums for the more modest number of the sicker uninsured who are most likely to participate.
Judge Hudson’s decision may be good politics but the policy implications will be devastating for millions of Americans. His decision jeopardizes putting affordable coverage out of reach for those who cannot find it now, especially those with pre-existing conditions. The Affordable Care Act seeks to improve our nation’s health system; Judge Hudson’s decision makes it worse.
By: Jonathan Gruber and Judy Feder-Jonathan Gruber is a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Judy Feder is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; Center For American Progress-December 14, 2010
Rep. Paul Ryan-The Flimflam Man
Rep. Paul Ryan
One depressing aspect of American politics is the susceptibility of the political and media establishment to charlatans. You might have thought, given past experience, that D.C. insiders would be on their guard against conservatives with grandiose plans. But no: as long as someone on the right claims to have bold new proposals, he’s hailed as an innovative thinker. And nobody checks his arithmetic.
Which brings me to the innovative thinker du jour: Representative Paul Ryan of Wisconsin.
Mr. Ryan has become the Republican Party’s poster child for new ideas thanks to his “Roadmap for America’s Future,” a plan for a major overhaul of federal spending and taxes. News media coverage has been overwhelmingly favorable; on Monday, The Washington Post put a glowing profile of Mr. Ryan on its front page, portraying him as the G.O.P.’s fiscal conscience. He’s often described with phrases like “intellectually audacious.”
But it’s the audacity of dopes. Mr. Ryan isn’t offering fresh food for thought; he’s serving up leftovers from the 1990s, drenched in flimflam sauce.
Mr. Ryan’s plan calls for steep cuts in both spending and taxes. He’d have you believe that the combined effect would be much lower budget deficits, and, according to that Washington Post report, he speaks about deficits “in apocalyptic terms.” And The Post also tells us that his plan would, indeed, sharply reduce the flow of red ink: “The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that Rep. Paul Ryan’s plan would cut the budget deficit in half by 2020.”
But the budget office has done no such thing. At Mr. Ryan’s request, it produced an estimate of the budget effects of his proposed spending cuts — period. It didn’t address the revenue losses from his tax cuts.
The nonpartisan Tax Policy Center has, however, stepped into the breach. Its numbers indicate that the Ryan plan would reduce revenue by almost $4 trillion over the next decade. If you add these revenue losses to the numbers The Post cites, you get a much larger deficit in 2020, roughly $1.3 trillion.
And that’s about the same as the budget office’s estimate of the 2020 deficit under the Obama administration’s plans. That is, Mr. Ryan may speak about the deficit in apocalyptic terms, but even if you believe that his proposed spending cuts are feasible — which you shouldn’t — the Roadmap wouldn’t reduce the deficit. All it would do is cut benefits for the middle class while slashing taxes on the rich.
And I do mean slash. The Tax Policy Center finds that the Ryan plan would cut taxes on the richest 1 percent of the population in half, giving them 117 percent of the plan’s total tax cuts. That’s not a misprint. Even as it slashed taxes at the top, the plan would raise taxes for 95 percent of the population.
Finally, let’s talk about those spending cuts. In its first decade, most of the alleged savings in the Ryan plan come from assuming zero dollar growth in domestic discretionary spending, which includes everything from energy policy to education to the court system. This would amount to a 25 percent cut once you adjust for inflation and population growth. How would such a severe cut be achieved? What specific programs would be slashed? Mr. Ryan doesn’t say.
After 2020, the main alleged saving would come from sharp cuts in Medicare, achieved by dismantling Medicare as we know it, and instead giving seniors vouchers and telling them to buy their own insurance. Does this sound familiar? It should. It’s the same plan Newt Gingrich tried to sell in 1995.
And we already know, from experience with the Medicare Advantage program, that a voucher system would have higher, not lower, costs than our current system. The only way the Ryan plan could save money would be by making those vouchers too small to pay for adequate coverage. Wealthy older Americans would be able to supplement their vouchers, and get the care they need; everyone else would be out in the cold.
In practice, that probably wouldn’t happen: older Americans would be outraged — and they vote. But this means that the supposed budget savings from the Ryan plan are a sham.
So why have so many in Washington, especially in the news media, been taken in by this flimflam? It’s not just inability to do the math, although that’s part of it. There’s also the unwillingness of self-styled centrists to face up to the realities of the modern Republican Party; they want to pretend, in the teeth of overwhelming evidence, that there are still people in the G.O.P. making sense. And last but not least, there’s deference to power — the G.O.P. is a resurgent political force, so one mustn’t point out that its intellectual heroes have no clothes.
But they don’t. The Ryan plan is a fraud that makes no useful contribution to the debate over America’s fiscal future.
By PAUL KRUGMAN-Op-Ed Columist and Nobel Prize Winner-Economics, The New York Times-Aug 5, 2010; Photo- Wikipedia
The Impact of Health Reform on Health System Spending
The health reform legislation passed in March 2010 will introduce a range of payment and delivery system changes designed to achieve a significant slowing of health care cost growth. Most assessments of the new reform law have focused only on the federal budgetary impact. This updated analysis projects the effect of national reform on total national health expenditures and the insurance premiums that American families would likely pay. We estimate that, on net, the combination of provisions in the new law will reduce health care spending by $590 billion over 2010–2019 and lower premiums by nearly $2,000 per family. Moreover, the annual growth rate in national health expenditures could be slowed from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent.
Overview
To judge the merit of the comprehensive health reform legislation recently signed into law by President Obama, it is essential to understand its impact on the affordability of insurance coverage and overall health care spending. Most assessments of the new law consider the federal budget only. For example, the Congressional Budget Office “scored” the federal budget impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as modified by the Reconciliation Act (Affordable Care Act), finding a modest deficit reduction in the first 10 years of implementation.
But the federal budget impact is not the same as the health system impact. A portion of the federal funds would be used to reduce costs for people who already have health insurance coverage but struggle to afford it, while very small businesses would receive help in paying insurance premiums. To estimate health spending accurately, we need to separate out the costs into new health care spending and transfers of existing spending from the private sector to the government. Furthermore, CBO assigned very little savings to system reform efforts, rendering its overall analysis incomplete.
The Office of the Actuary within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, meanwhile, estimated the health system impacts of the Affordable Care Act and determined there would be a small increase in medical spending as a result of the reform. But, again, this analysis is limited, since it gives almost no weight to proposals for improving the information available to providers and modifying the financial incentives in the current system.
This study considers the new law, as enacted in March 2010, to project the impact of major health reform on national health expenditures and the insurance premiums that families will likely pay, accounting for the full range of impacts the legislation is likely to induce. As part of our analysis, we provide estimates of the effect of key provisions on health spending by government, employers, and households. We build on our earlier analysis of the draft legislation, taking account of the provisions in the final law.
Impact of reform on national health expenditures
Health care reform will affect national health expenditures through five major channels.
Impact of new coverage
Extending health insurance coverage to essentially all Americans will increase medical spending, at least in the short run. (Some argue that increased coverage will lower spending over time by making it possible to pursue more-aggressive cost-containment policies without risking access to care for the uninsured, but in this analysis we do not consider such effects.) From previous studies, data are available to estimate the magnitude of the increase in spending. Hadley and colleagues, for example, estimated that each uninsured individual who gains coverage will incur annually an additional $1,600 of medical care expenses—an increase of 70 percent. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that spending for uninsured individuals, if they become insured, will increase by 25 percent to 60 percent. The actual increase will depend in part on the rates that are paid to health care providers for treating currently uninsured patients.
For our estimates, we increase the $1,600 figure over time with expected increases in medical costs. We then multiply the revised amounts by the number of newly insured resulting from health reform to produce a total estimate. Fully phased in, incremental coverage costs about $75 billion per year to cover 60 percent of the uninsured, or 2 percent of total health care spending. This is comparable to Davis and Schoen’s projection that covering all of the uninsured would add 3 percent to medical spending, and Schoen, Davis, and Collins’s finding that covering all of the uninsured would add 2 percent to medical spending. This methodology suggests that the new law will lead to a 10-year cumulative medical spending increase of $415 billion over the period 2010–2019. This estimate is shown in the first row of Exhibit 1.
Savings in public programs
The new health reform law contains a number of changes to Medicare and Medicaid payments. Many of these are traditional payment changes—for example, reductions in the amount paid to Medicare Advantage managed care plans to a level comparable with the cost of covering beneficiaries under traditional Medicare, or smaller increases in Medicare inpatient payments to account for a likely increase in productivity and to reduce bad debts. Our estimates of the medical spending impact of these changes come from CBO. While this is a good place to begin, it should be noted that CBO has often misestimated, or failed to estimate, the behavioral consequences of such changes in the past.
We consider all such changes, with a few exceptions: 1) we exempt the net savings associated with health care modernization (Section 1104 and Title III, subtitle A, of the reform bill), which is treated separately; 2) we omit the sections associated with coverage expansions, which are accounted for above; and 3) we omit savings from the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, which are a collection of premiums in anticipation of future spending. CBO estimates that the net impact of the remaining proposals in the reform law is to reduce Medicare and Medicaid spending by $416 billion over the 2010–2019 period. This estimate is depicted in the second row of Exhibit 1.
The reduction in Medicare and Medicaid spending is approximately on par with the increase in medical costs associated with covering the uninsured. The net impact of covering the uninsured and reducing traditional program payments (and other taxes from outside the health care system) is a decrease in spending of $1 billion over 2010–2019. This roughly parallels the analysis from the Office of the Actuary, which estimated that national medical expenditures under the new law will increase by $311 billion over 2010–2019. The difference of about $30 billion per year is very small on the scale of health expenditures (less than 1 percent per year), and it indicates that our analysis matches that of the actuary when no other cost changes are considered.
Our analysis assumes that a reduction in Medicare and Medicaid payments will not be offset by higher prices to private payers and, equivalently, that fewer uninsured patients will not yield savings to existing payers because of the reduced need of payers to shift costs onto covered patients. This assumption is common to other estimators and is consistent with empirical research.
Insurance exchanges
Currently, nearly 13 percent of insurance premiums are accounted for by administrative costs. These costs range from about 5 percent in large firms and firms that are self-insured to 30 percent for individuals. Higher costs for marketing, underwriting, churning, benefit complexity, and brokers’ fees explain the bulk of the difference.
The new reform law establishes insurance exchanges that will group individuals and small firms into larger entities and thus drive down those administrative costs. The exchanges also will minimize marketing costs through more transparent posting of premiums, facilitated enrollment (assistance with the application process and screening for eligibility), and stronger oversight of industry practices.
If all individuals and small firms were to receive the same premiums as large firms or self-insured firms do, the costs of insurance administration would decline to less than 10 percent. In analyzing the experience of other countries, The Commonwealth Fund estimated that administrative costs could fall to 8 percent or lower under a robust exchange system. We assume more modest savings, such that administrative costs fall to 10 percent of total premiums—a rate also assumed to remain constant over time, even though this implies administrative costs increase along with national health spending. We assume such savings begin in 2014, the year the exchanges will become operational, and are phased in over three years. The reduction in health spending associated with reduced insurer administration is $211 billion over 2010–2019.
CBO estimates $27 billion in administrative savings owing to insurance exchanges over 10 years. CBO assumes premium reductions of between 1 percent and 4 percent for small groups in the exchanges, and no savings for large groups, for an average of about 0.4 percent. We assume additional savings above this amount, totaling $184 billion over 2010–2019 (see third line of Exhibit 1).
Health system modernization
The reform law includes numerous provisions intended to improve the information available to patients and providers and the incentives facing medical care providers, and thus make medical care more efficient. The Commonwealth Fund has summarized these provisions. Within the Medicare and Medicaid programs, these include:
- Payment innovations, including higher reimbursement for preventive care services and patient-centered primary care, bundled payment for hospital, physician, and other services provided for a single episode of care, shared savings or capitation payments for accountable provider groups that assume responsibility for the continuum of a patient’s care, and pay-for-performance incentives for Medicare providers
- An Independent Payment Advisory Board, with the authority to make recommendations that reduce cost growth and improve quality in both the Medicare program and the health system as a whole
- A new Innovation Center within the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, charged with streamlining the testing of demonstration and pilot projects in Medicare and rapidly expanding successful models across the program
- Profiling medical care providers on the basis of cost and quality, making that data available to consumers and insurance plans, and providing relatively low-quality, high-cost providers with financial incentives to improve their care
- Increased funding for comparative effectiveness research
- Increased emphasis on wellness and prevention.
The exact amount that will be saved from these provisions collectively is uncertain. Partly as a result of this uncertainty, CBO and the Office of the Actuary assume only minor savings. For example, CBO estimated that the major parts of the law including these provisions will cost $10 billion over the 2010–2019 period, while the Office of the Actuary determined savings of only $2 billion.
Other estimates, however, suggest that an aggressive approach to health care modernization could result in significantly greater cost reductions. Beeuwkes-Buntin and Cutler estimated a 1.5-percentage-point reduction in cost increases annually from significant health care reform, or more than $700 billion in the 10-year window. These savings would come from two primary sources. First, administrative expenses incurred by provider groups would decline as electronic medical records, and incentives to use them appropriately, are widely disseminated. The potential for administrative savings has been stressed by both provider groups and insurers, and they are distinct from the reduction in insurance administration noted above. Second, reform would lead to fewer and less-costly acute care episodes. Potentially substantial savings could be had by preventing certain illnesses from recurring through better coordination of care and by rationalizing what is done when a person becomes sick by bundling payments, paying more for quality care, and sharing savings with accountable provider organizations.
Similarly, Hussey, Eibner, Ridgely et al. estimate that savings of more than 10 percent are possible, largely from payment reforms like bundled-payment systems. Realizing these savings over a decade implies cost reductions of nearly 1.5 percentage points annually. A more conservative mid-range set of assumptions suggests that such reforms could reduce growth in national health expenditures by about one percentage point per year.
The combination of provisions in the new law will achieve substantial savings in total health spending. A Commonwealth Fund report indicates that similar provisions will slow annual growth in national health expenditures from 6.5 percent to 5.6 percent over the period 2010–2020. Thus, cost reductions on the order of 1.0 percentage points are realistic. We assume such savings are first realized in 2014, to allow time for payment changes to be designed and implemented and exchanges to become operational.
The public and private savings from health system modernization are $406 billion over the 10 years (see fourth line of Exhibit 1). These savings are smaller in the early years but increase over time.
Taking account of these different factors, on net the new law will reduce health care spending by $590 billion over 2010–2019. Exhibit 2 shows the changes by year, highlighting significant savings potential as payment and system reforms are fully phased in.
We find that the annual rate of growth in national health expenditures falls from 6.1 percent before reform to 5.7 percent after reform. When the current projection is corrected to reflect underutilization of services by the uninsured, the reform package lowers the annual rate of growth from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent, a reduction of 0.6 percentage points per year (Exhibit 3).
The savings we estimate are comparable to the reports by CBO and the Office of the Actuary, with the exception that we also include reasonable impacts of system modernization incentives and efforts to streamline sales of insurance.
Impact on the federal budget
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the reform law will reduce the federal deficit by $143 billion over the 10 years, 2010–2019. Our estimates of the federal deficit impact differ from CBO’s in two ways. First, we include savings to Medicare and Medicaid resulting from health system modernization. In addition, reductions in employer spending for health insurance lead to increases in wage and salary payments, which are taxed by the federal government. While CBO accounted for some of this effect in recent estimates, further reductions in employer spending for health insurance can be expected from modernization and lower administrative costs. We assume that 90 percent of private health insurance savings are passed on to employees through increased wages, which are taxed at an average marginal rate of 28 percent.
The net effect is a federal deficit reduction of $400 billion over 2010–2019 (Exhibit 4). This reduction results from several factors. As estimated by CBO, the federal cost of insurance coverage expansion is $788 billion. Savings from payment and system reform provisions are projected to generate $682 billion—more than is estimated by CBO, owing to the reasonable estimates of health system modernization provisions. Our federal tax revenue projection mirrors that of CBO’s, though we also add in the additional revenue from employer savings and increased wages from modernization and lower administrative costs—projected to raise $86 billion over the 10-year, 2010–2019 period.
Impact on Medicare
Prior to reform, Medicare expenditures were projected to grow by 6.8 percent annually from 2010 to 2019 (Exhibit 5). The payment and system reform savings estimated by CBO total $397 billion when CLASS and non-Medicare provisions are removed. Applying these net Medicare savings bends the Medicare spending curve and reduces the projected annual growth rate to 5.5 percent. When additional savings from health system modernization are accounted for, the annual growth rate is reduced to 4.9 percent and total 10-year savings reach $524 billion.
Impact on premiums for private coverage
Reducing insurer administration and modernizing the delivery of health care services will each result in reductions in private insurance premiums. Private premiums might be affected by other provisions as well. For example, an excise tax on high-premium health insurance plans, set to take effect in 2018, will introduce a strong financial incentive for insurers to trim benefits and reduce costs below a tax-free threshold of $10,200 for individual coverage and $27,500 for family coverage. Indexing this cap to the overall rate of inflation in the economy plus one percentage point will encourage insurers to seek out value and efficiency continually, thus placing downward pressure on premiums over time.
Health reform might also alter the generosity of the average insurance benefits offered, which may raise premiums for certain groups. In the current market, many people have coverage that is extremely limited, with deductibles totaling many thousands of dollars and entire classes of services that are excluded. Such people will face premium increases under reform, although the quality of the coverage will be significantly improved and out-of-pocket expenses reduced.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that such changes will increase nongroup premiums. For purposes of this analysis, we exclude changes in premiums associated with better coverage, since one would need to consider the impacts of the enhanced coverage and correspondingly lower out-of-pocket spending to be able to gauge the impact of the changes accurately.
In addition, health reform might change the risk pool and thus affect the average cost of enrollees. Limiting age-based underwriting without providing offsetting subsidies to young adults would drive many within this population out of the insurance market. Close-to-universal coverage, in contrast, might bring more young people into the market, thus lowering premiums. Because of the issues associated with changes in out-of-pocket spending when people move in and out of coverage, this effect is, again, omitted.
We estimate the impact of insurance exchanges and system reform on average premiums using a method analogous to the one proposed above. In particular, we consider how reductions in administrative loads and more-efficient care delivery will affect average market premiums. The basis for the premium estimates is the average employer premium in 2006, as determined by the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. This premium is then trended forward using the projected growth of premiums under the different scenarios.
Exhibit 6 shows the premium estimates. Without reform, premiums are expected to increase from $13,305 in 2010 to $21,458 in 2019. Relative to this increase, premiums under reform increase only three-quarters as much. By 2019, family premiums are nearly $2,000 lower. Adding reductions in out-of-pocket costs and lower taxes for Medicare and Medicaid will result in estimated savings for the typical family of over $2,500 that year. Again, these are conservative estimates: a recent analysis by the Business Roundtable prepared by Hewitt, for example, found that such legislative reforms could potentially reduce the trend line in employment-based health care spending by about $3,000 per employee by 2019.22
Explaining the difference with other estimates
The estimated health system savings we present are larger than those forecast by the Congressional Budget Office and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Office of the Actuary, which are similar to each other. The common assessments of CBO and the CMS actuary are not surprising, since most of the evidence upon which they are based comprises peer-reviewed studies that utilize carefully controlled comparison groups (either randomized trials or the natural equivalent). Within that genre, the dominant published themes are the inexorable nature of technology-led medical care cost increases, and the resulting need for unalterable demand- or supply-side constraints to confront that trend.
Although there is significant evidence in the literature that medical care providers are responsive to financial incentives, there is not much evidence in the published literature on policy reforms short of severe constraints that save large amounts of money. And for every study that shows savings from baseline, there is another study that does not. Thus, the common assessment is that there is little efficacious that can be done.
There is, however, a less formal, but no less important, literature that sees the world very differently. Business scholars, including Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg, and Clay Christenson, Jerome Grossman, and Jason Hwang, all note the enormous inefficiency in health care relative to other industries: excessive administrative spending, wasted time and money, and resources spent not reducing costs but simply passing them along to others. These scholars highlight the enormous potential for productivity improvement that reform can drive if it makes health care operate more like other industries.
Through their experiences, health care practitioners reach a similar conclusion. Physicians on the frontlines of medicine, including Guy Clifton, Arthur Garson, Atul Gawande, and Arnold Relman, see the waste that exists and hold a common view on why it exists—principally, misaligned incentives. They show how health care would be better and cheaper were it not for a health care system that discourages such improvements. Echoing the story of misaligned incentives are journalistic accounts showing how the health system fails patients, physicians, and society as a payer. Each case cries out for reforms that would change the underlying perverse incentives.
A number of case studies lend support for the potential of reform. The experiences of Geisinger Health System, HealthPartners, Denver Health, and other health care delivery organizations demonstrate that health can be improved and costs lowered. They also point to the components that are most critical for system improvement. While these studies are often published in the professional literature, their authors do not employ the careful comparison groups that would make the results compelling to the most skeptical reviewers. Thus, case study findings are not given as much emphasis as they otherwise might.
While views differ as to appropriate evidence standards, the situation we analyze is one where there are essentially no clinical trials and where effects of multiple large policy changes may differ substantially from the effects of small trials of single interventions. In such a situation, it is imperative to cast a wider net than traditional evidence standards do. Our decision to be more inclusive in the use of evidence is the primary reason why our results diverge from those of CBO and the CMS Office of the Actuary.
Conclusion
The new health reform law introduces a range of payment and delivery system changes likely to result in a significant slowing of health care cost growth. First, the law calls for the creation of health insurance exchanges that offer a choice of plans and the ability, for the first time, to truly compare plan premiums. The exchanges will have authority to reject plans with excessive premium increases and to set caps on insurance profits and overhead of no more than 15 percent of premiums for large firms and 20 percent of the premiums for small firms and individuals, producing savings to employers and workers that might reach 15 percent to 20 percent by 2019.
The law also begins to change how providers are paid and care is delivered, so that they are rewarded not for the volume of services they provide but for the value they offer. It accelerates the testing, adoption, and spread of innovative payment methods to control growth in volume of services. The law also includes extensive provisions to report data on quality and cost and to enhance choice. Finally, the law directs investments in primary and preventive care, among other changes, that have the potential to yield substantial savings.
In addition to significant payment and delivery system reform, the Affordable Care Act will extend coverage to an estimated 32 million previously uninsured Americans by 2019. Improving access to care should return substantial improvement in overall population health, increase workforce productivity, and reduce the significant financial risk uninsured and underinsured individuals and families now face in the unreformed market.
Even with these improvements in coverage, we estimate that the combination of provisions in the new law will save $590 billion or more in national health spending over 2010–2019 and lower premiums by nearly $2,000 per family. The annual growth rate in national health expenditures will be slowed from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent.
Congress and the President have enacted a historic health care reform law that will help ensure that all families are able to get the care they need, as well as financial security and relief from rising premiums. The legislation is a significant first step toward bending the health care cost curve for the federal government and families, and it will yield real economic benefits.
By David M. Cutler, Karen Davis, Kristof Stremikis | May 21, 2010-Center for American Progress
Closing Arguments-The Day of Reckoning
President Obama making the final arguments for Health Reform
My Saturday began on the West lawn of Capitol Hill, where conservative activists were mounting one final, desperate effort to block health care reform. They came by the thousands, carrying flags and pushing strollers, in a demonstration of genuine grassroots fervor. They chanted “Kill the Bill,” over and over again, in a vaguely menacing tone that, perhaps, foretold a bit of ugliness to come.
But the most remarkable thing about the demonstration was how little it had to do with health care. The signs said “Stop socialism,” “A government of laws, not men,” “Respect our constitution–preserve our republic.” Nobody talked about death panels. Instead, one speaker–a Chicago radio host, I believe–attacked the First Lady’s obesity initiative. “Michelle, keep your hands off my kids’ lunchbox!” Yet another protest sign seemed to capture the mood perfectly: “This isn’t about health care. This is about control.”
A few hours later, inside the Capitol complex, President Obama urged House Democrats to do precisely what the protesters feared: Pass health care reform. It was not the first time he’d given such a speech. Just before the House voted on its initial reform bill in November, he’d come to Capitol Hill. And, broadly speaking, his intent had been the same: To embolden the Democrats by making them enthusiastic about the cause, demonstrating his own commitment to it, and making clear the political virtues of success.
But, like the protesters, this time Obama seemed to dwell less on health care and more on the significance of the moment. He invoked Lincoln, and the importance of fighting for principle. And then he invoked the legacy of the New Deal and Great Society, reminding members that their purpose in office was not to win elections–it was to make life better for their constituents. His closing argument was not about policy or politics. It was about posterity. And it was good.
For the last week or so, ever since it’s become apparent a climactic vote on health care was approaching, I’ve also been thinking about closing arguments. For most of the past year–and, really, it’s been far more than a year–the argument has been most practical. What would the bill do? What wouldn’t it do? And it’s easy enough to make the case for reform on those grounds.
As readers of this space know, I like to think of reform as achieving three broad goals: Making sure anybody can get an affordable insurance policy, shoring up everybody’s coverage so that it provides real economic security, and transforming medical care in order to make it both more effective and less expensive. Those arguments got a lot stronger this week, when the Congressional Budget Office determined that the final reform package–including both the Senate’s health care bill and the proposed amendments to it–would provide coverage to 32 million additional people, strengthen the baseline for coverage, and reduce the federal deficit over time.
But there’s another argument for health care reform, one that is at once more subtle and more sweeping. The disturbing part of our health care system is the financial and physical suffering it causes. But the unjust part of our health care system is the way it distributes that suffering. There are things all of us can do to stay healthy–we can eat right, we can exercise, we can avoid excessive risks. But even when we do the right things, we remain vulnerable.
You can have the perfect diet, jog three miles every day, and wake up one morning to discover you have cancer. So now you face mortal peril. And if, on top of everything else, you can’t pay your medical bills, you face financial ruin, as well.
Chance, of course, is part of life. Americans, in particular, seem to accept that. But every now and then, we have decided that need for such expansion–that there was, even now, the kind of common vulnerability to chance that required the sorts of initiatives we had enacted in the past. It happened with the New Deal, when we created the modern welfare state, and then again with the Great Society, when we expanded it.
The signature programs of these eras, Social Security and Medicare, work because they address a vulnerability we all share. Everybody is at risk of getting old; and everybody is at risk of misfortune, physical and financial, when that happens. To protect against that misfortune–to insure against that misfortune–all of us contribute. We all give, in the form of financial contributions; and we all get, in the form of financial security. Together, quite literally, we are stronger than when we are apart.
The conservatives protesting on the Capitol lawn Saturday see things differently. Health care reform isn’t about contributing money for the sake of their own security; it’s about having their money taken for the sake of somebody else’s security. When they hear stories of people left bankrupt or sick because of uninsurance, they are more likely to see a lack of personal responsibility and virtue than a lack of good fortune. As my colleague Jonathan Chait has observed, theirs is an extreme version of a view common (although surely not universal) on the right: That individuals can fend for themselves, as long as they are responsible and as long as the government gets out of the way.
There’s obviously a balance to be struck between these two world views. But, broadly speaking, conservative ideas about responsibility and vulnerability have dominated political discussion for most of the last four decades. That will change on Sunday, if health care reform passes. The bill before Congress may be flawed. And the process that produced it may be severely flawed. But it is, nevertheless, an expression of the idea that we–as as society–are not prepared to let people continue to suffer such dire consequences just because they’re unlucky.
A few hours after Obama was speaking, the Capitol had nearly cleared out. Leadership staff were meeting in House Speaker Pelosi’s office while a few stray congressmen were giving floor speeches to a nearly empty chamber. By and large, though, members had scattered–a tell-tale sign that Pelosi was confident. If she’d still needed to do serious arm-twisting, she’d have held a series of votes to keep members on the Hill.
I walked the length of the building and then out to the east lawn where the conservative protesters, who spent the day visiting (and, on a few occasions, haranguing) House Democrats, had reconvened. The crowd was more subdued now. It was smaller, too–hundreds instead of thousands. The setting sun behind the capitol dome cast a long shadow over them, as night approached. But a new dawn would come soon enough. And with it, perhaps, a new era.
By: Jonathan Cohn-Senior Editor-The New Republic-March 21, 2010
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